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ABSTRACT
This paper is to examine three businesses
developed in tha first two decades *.

he twentieth

century by Isaac Post Baker in Bismarck, North Dakota.
Baker was a noted river transportation man, businessman,
politician, and banker in pioneer North Dakota.

From his

personal papers I traced the developments of his Bismarck
Realty Company, his Bismarck Elevator and Investment
Company, and his Expansion Lumber and .Mercantile Company.
By examining the developments of these businesses, a
better understanding can toe gained of the changes which
developed along the Upper Missouri River during this time
period in regard to Baker*s dispersal of farmland,
raising and buying of grain, and shipment of grain to
market.
The Bismarck Realty Company regulated the sale of
Baker's farm and ranchland in western North Dakota.
also sold real estate within Bismarck.

It

The Bismarck

Elevator and Investment Company bought grain from farmers
located along the Missouri River north of Bismarck and
sold it to Minneapolis and Duluth firms.

The Expansion

Lumber and Mercantile Company operated lumber and hardware
stores in conjunction with Baker's grain buying elevators
on the Missouri River.
vi

All three companies greatly depended upon the
grain trade along the Missouri River north of 3ismarck for
their livelihood.

By exploring their activities, it is

possible to witness a virtual phasing out of a particular
method of disposing of farmland and grain along the Upper
Missouri River, and the persistent efforts of an aging
entrepreneur to prevent it from happening.

rxx
Kf-f-'l

I
mmm

*****

....

—

'-Mk

- ------------ - _____---------------

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Isaac Post Baker emerged as an important pioneer
businessman in the Bismarck area of North Dakota in the
early 1890* ° - after initially establishing himself in the
Bismarck area as a steamboat transportation magnate.
Born in Weston, Missouri, on July 20, 1855, Baker
attended Central Methodist College at Fayette, Missouri.
After his college days, the Captain— a name which friends
gave to Baker— worked closely with his father and learned
the boating business.

He operated independently in

St. Louis as an agent for several boatlines before going
to Bismarck in 1881 as a general agent for the Benton
Transportation Company.1
The Captain’s economic involvements rapidly
expanded once he arrived in Bismarcsc.

It is impossible

to determine exactly where Baker received his financial
backing, yet he did invest in many activities.

By 1883

Baker had become part owner of some of the boats of the
Benton Transportation Company.

In the late 1830's he

purchased the Bank of Bismarck along 'with Montana
^William E. Lass, "Isaac P. Baker and the Baker
Papers," North Dakota History, XXIV {Oct., 195/},
pp. 175-177.
1

2
businessman and politician, T, C. Power.

Power appeared

to be one source of supply for Baker's capital.

The

Captain broadened his economic involvements to include
the Cannonball Cattle Company and various mercantile and
e leva tor fi.rms.2
Baker’s interests were not limited to business
and transportation.

After the Captain's death in 1938,

a newspaperman of the day commented:
That the Captain was a versatile man was clearly
established by his many interests and the accom
plishments attained in his every undertaking.
Besides being a banker, and an expert in river
transportation, he was a farmer . . . .
Agriculture
was not purely academic with Captain Baker. He
fanned until very recent years as many acres as any
man in this section {"Bismarck"] and raised pure
bred {~3icj hogs.3
Baker's agricultural interests included finding new
grasses which would adapt to North Dakota's environment
and the scientific breeding of purebred cattle.4
This study focuses on three business enterprises
of Isaac Post Baker.

The Bismarck Realty Company dealt

in the sale of real estate, farmland, and ranchland in
and around the Bismarck area.

The Bismarck Eleva cor and

Investment Company established elevators along the
Missouri River north of Bismarck and purchased grain from
the farmers in the area.

The grain was shipped to either

"'Bismarck Tribane, Jan. 28, 1938, p. 2.
4Lass, Isaac P. Baker and the Baker Papers,”

3
Duluth or Minneapolis grain buying 4 m s .

The Expansion

Lumber and Mercantile Company operated lumber and hard
ware stores established in conjunction with Baker’s
elevators*

By closely examining the activities and

levelopments of these three Baker companies, one is able
to gain an insight into the business activities of I, P»
laker and a virtual phasing out of a particular method of
d sposing of land and grain along the Upper Missouri
R ver in the first two decades of the twentieth century.
The Captain established his Bismarck Realty
Company in 1904*

Through this company Baker sold lots

W; thin the city of Bismarck and soli, as well as rented,
ft r® and ranch land in western North Dakota.
farmland was unbroken prairie sod.
for ranchers.

Much of this

Some was grazing land

When unable to sell his land, the Captain

o•
“ten rented it to incoming settlers.
* tom Baker sold could not pay cash.

Many of those to
Be usually financed

such customers toy one of several methods.

Baker’s real

.•state company prospered as long as grain yields on his
land were high.

With the advent of poor crops after 1915,

his situation began to deteriorate,

k variety of personal

mir.takes, as well as natural calamities caused the company
to virtually end all its activities by 1923.
The grain trade along the Missouri River north of
Bismarck played the primary role in stimulating business
for all three of Baker's companies.

The Bismarck Elevator

and Investment Company operated the many elevators along

4
the Missouri River which purchased the farmer*s grain.
Although incorporated in 1882, available records show
that Baker’s company did not play a significant role in
the grain trade until after 1900.

A newspaperman of the

day explained how these elevators operated:
West of Bismarck the railroads touch the Missouri
valley in only a few places, the farmers# instead of
hauling their grain inland to the railroads# haul it
to the river for shipment by boat. At each of the
landings Captain Baker has a small elevator where the
grain is stored until shipment. Then# when a boat
comes along# the grain is loaded in bulk and carried
down to Bismarck where it is unloaded by a movable
jslc] hoist into the elevator at the top of thw bank
amFirora that into cars.^
After the grain was loaded into railroad cars# the
Captain shipped it to either Minneapolis or Duluth firms.
Baker realised a profit in this speculation and handling
by paying the farmers from fourteen to twenty cents less
than Minneapolis or Duluth firms.

Thus, even with

shipping charges deleted# Baker usually realized a profit.
The Bismarck Plevator and Investment Company
showed profits in its early years# so long as grain
yields along the Missouri remained relatively high.

Poor

crops after 1915 caused a drastic decline in the amount
of grain the company bought.

At approximately the same

time# the railroad entered into the territory along the
Missouri River and brought other grain buyers with it.
Baker was faced with poor crops and stiff competition.
In addition to these problems# Baker made many foolish
'Bisroarck Tribune# Jan. 28# 1938# o. 2.

$
Mistakes and used poor judgment in operating his company.
Its business continued to decline; there survives no trace
of its operations after 1925.
The grain trade along the Missouri River served
as the primary source of business for both the Benton
Transportation Company and the Benton Packet Company.
These companies are not a part of this study, but their
activities played a role in the developments of ail three
companies under discussion.

These companies carried the

grain by boat from Baker's elevators along the river to
Bismarck.

However, because of the seasonal nature of

grain farming, the business did not keep the companies’
vessels busy throughout the year.

During slack periods,

the Captain’s boats carried large supplies of building
materials such as lumber and sand, together with
agricultural machinery and general merchandise.6

These

goods provided stock for the local lumber and hardware
stores.
In 1906 the Expansion Lumber and Mercantile
Company applied for incorporation.

The company,

principally under Baker's direct supervision, guided the
activities of the small lumber and hardware stores
located at his elevator sites.

The company originally

purchased virtually its entire stock of goods and
^William E. Lass, ft History of Steamboating on the
Upper Missouri River (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1962), p. 163.

if
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material from the Bismarck Elevator and Investment
Company.

In its early years the company realized profits

by selling lumber and hardware to the many farmers moving
into the area.

As poor crops developed, however, farmers

charged their merchandise.

These charge customers

continued to cause Baker grave concern.

A growing list

of charge customers and one crop failure after another
forced the company to close its doors.

In 1918 it was

taken over by the Bismarck Elevator and Investment
Company, the organization out of which it had originally
developed.
The majority of the material used in this study
comes from the account books and correspondence of
Baker's several companies.

There is a noticeable over

lapping of the records of these, as their affairs were
intertwined and closely meshed.

Therefore, it is

virtually impossible to separate the bookkeeping accounts
of the three companies.

This fact, however, does not

work a hardship on the student of Baker's affairs, as the
correspondence of the Captain provides much insight into
the year-by-year developments of the Baker organizations.
Certain records and letters dealing with the transactions
these thi.cc enterprises are conspicuously missing from
the I. ?. Baker Manuscript Collection.

However, enough

pertinent facts and data are available to give a rather
accurate description of the activities of these
organizations.

l;
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THE BISMARCK REALTY COMPANY
The business interests of Isaac Post Baker
encompassed a wide area of diversified endeavors.

The

Captain became involved in land speculation in and around
the Bismarck vicinity in the early 1900's.

His concern

was mainly involved in transactions in farming and
grazing land, but he also bought and sold real estate
within the city of Bismarck.

The Bismarck Realty Company

became his chief instrument for dealing in real estate
activities.
Incorporated on December 21, 1903, in Bismarck,
North Dakota, the Bismarck Realty Company boasted a
capital stock of $25,000 divided into 250 shares with a
par value of $100 each.

Baker, his younger brother,

John F. Baker, Jr., and James A. Kruhm, all of Bismarck,
served as owners and directors of the company.

Records

do not indicate the exact number of shares held by each of
the three men.
manager.

Baker, as maioritv stockholder, acted as

The roles played by Kruhm and John F.

Baker, Jr., proved limited and had little to do with
later development of the. company.
The object of the corporation was "to buy and

7

8
sell, own, lease, or deal in any and all kinds of real
estate and personal property for profit anywhere within
the state of North Dakota or in the United States.”
Twenty years served as its original term of existence.^
The company, of which Baker was manager, had its offices
above LliOtsS o f Liie odnk or BisniarcK, another Baker

concern.^

Land dealings in Burleigh, Kidder, McLean, and

Mercer counties in North Dakota comprised the largest
share of the firm’s business, although land was held in
other North Dakota counties.

3

With the ability to foresee possibly advantageous
financial situations, the Captain had purchased large
tracts of western North Dakota farm and ranchland before
the incorporation of his real estate company.

According

to one newspaperman:
I. P. Baker, the Bismarck banker and stockman, is
preparing for the advent of foreign settlers in the
eastern part of the state and the consequent
absorption of the great stock ranges by purchasing
and leasing large tracts of land along the Cannonball
River, in the western part of the state, in order
that he may have undisturbed range and grazing
privileges. He has purchased several sections of
railroad land and has leased enough contiguous school
^Letter from Ben Meier, North Dakota Secretary of
State, Bismarck, Aug. 24, 1972.
9
"Letter, Baker to Bismarck Tribune, Sept. 5, 1914,
Isaac Post Baker Papers, Oriii G. Libby Historical
Manuscript Collection, Chester A. Fritz Library,
University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, North Dakota.
Box 88, Folder 2.
^Letter, Baker to E. C. Leedy, May 27, 1914,
I. P. Baker Papers, Box 88, Folder 2.

land from the state to give him a tract several miles
in extent, and comprising many thousand acres. **
Much of this land eventually comprised another Baker
financial concern, the Cannonball Cattle Company,

The

Bismarck Realty Company offered for sale remaining
portions of the land.
When buying land along the Cannonball River,
Baker succeeded in having the state convert government
land into school land.

Baker then leased this land at a

nominal rate, to give him control of blocks several miles
square.

Meanwhile, many ranchers located on, or in the

vicinity of, this land received eviction notices.

Most

had erected corrals, stables, and other buildings
required for ranching purposes.

His success led many

people to question how Baker, a noted Democrat and
populist, could possibly convince a Republican state
administration to comply with his every whim.4
5

Open

friction developed between Baker and western North Dakota
ranchers.
Always thinking of ways to increase the value of
his newly acquired land, the Captain believed that if
more water could be discovered in western North Dakota,
commerce of the Missouri River and the value of land
could be improved.

Baker declared:

"I am well convinced,

41898 Baker Scrapbook, I. ?. Baker Papers,
Book 539.
5Ibid.

10
if a system of Artesian wells were inaugerated Qsicj| and
driven down until the Dakota sandstone strata is reached,
say approximately 2,200 feet, an inexhaustible supply of
good flowing water can be had."

Baker further proposed

that such an operation should be conducted by the United
States Government through River and Harbor appro
priations.

Baker proposed, under the direction of the

Secretary of War, surveying, driving wells, and locating
the artesian water supply tributary to the Upper Missouri
6
River.
The undertaking never materialized, yet, Baker
showed insight into a possible solution for the water
shortage problem plaguing western North Dakota.
Records do not indicate the original holdings of
the company after its incorporation in 1903.

By 1911

Baker's organization owned 3,000 acres in Burleigh County,
17,000 acres in Billings County, and 3,000 acres in Kidder
County.

Lots in the city of Bismarck and in the McKenzie

townsite in Burleigh County comprised the remaining
property.7

The land in Burleigh and Kidder counties was

well suited to wheat, flax, and other small grain.

The

value of the small grain land was much higher than that
of the grazing land, of Billings County, located in
extreme western North Dakota.

In 1913 the company paid

^Letter, Baker to F. W. Wilsey, Dec. 17, 1900,
I. P. Baker Papers, Box 38, Folder 1,
7
Letter, Baker to Frank Reeves, May 19, 1911,
I. P. Baker Papers, Box 88, Folder 1.

11
$282.27 in taxes to Billings County for land it owned.

Q

During the first decade of the twentieth century,
North Dakota's population increased eighty per cent.
This figure compared with a forty per cent increase for
South Dakota.

The eighty per cent increase for North

Dakota was about seven and one-half times that of the
increases in Minnesota, Missouri, Illinois, Kansas, and
9
Nebraska. Iowa showed a decrease.
Incoming settlers
needed farmsteads on which they could establish
themselves.

Baker's company, aware of this inward

migration, greeted it optimistically.

The North Dakota

Commission of Agriculture also was aware of many new
settlers casting their longing eye at North Dakota's
virgin prairies and rolling grassland.

It contacted

various real estate dealers and other agents in the state
interested in securing more settlers for North Dakota, and
also capitalists and others interested in making
investments within the state.

The Commission invited

Baker and other real estate agents to a meeting.

W. C.

Gilbreath, a member of the commission, stated that "the
object of this gathering is to mature plans and devise
methods best suited to irduce immigration, and to present
the claims of North Dakota in its most favorable light."
O
Letter, Bismarck Reetlfcy Co. to County Treasurer
for Billings County in North Diikota, Dec. 22, 1913, I. P.
Baker Papers, Box 88, Folder 1.
^Letter, Bee Publishing Co. to Bismarck Realty Co.,
Feb. 28, 1911, I. P. Baker Papers, Box 88, Folder 1,

According to Gilbreath, "agents and real estate dealers
have acted independently of each other,"

By jointly

formulating certain plans and inducements, more
satisfactory results could be attained.^

Much of the

immigration to North Dakota came from other states where
farmers had operated as sharecroppers or tenant farmers.
North Dakota opened up as a new frontier for those
seeking farmland of their own and for many seeking a new
lease on life.
A large number of immigrants arrived from the Old
World with the hope of starting life anew on a farm or
ranch of their own.

A number of new settlers arrived

from Sweden and Norway.

Many of the Swedes originally

settled in the New England States, working in factories
and farms, looking for a chance to better their lot.
Baker, aware of this opportunity for prospective
customers, often advertised his holdings in the
immigrants' own newspapers such as The Eastern Herald,
the only Swedish-American newspaper in Connecticut.
The Captain often employed real estate agents who spoke
the immigrants' language to better communicate with his
prospective customers.
The German settlers in such states as Missouri,*
I
^Letter, W, C. Gilbreath to Bismarck Realty Co.,
Jan. 18, 1906, I. P. Baker Papers, Bex 88, Folder 1.
I1
'“‘Letter, Eastern Herald to Bi smarck Realty Co.,
July 29, 1904, I. P. Baker Papers, Box 88, Folder 1.

13
Illinois, Kansas, and Nebraska offered, another source of
prospective customers for the Bismarck Realty Company.
Many of these Germans subscribed to various religious,
German papers such as the Herald des Glaubens, published
in St. Louis, Missouri.

Baker's advertisements, placed

in such papers as this, gained the confidence of a number
of Germans and many times yielded results.

By appealing

to the various ethnic groups in their own languages, the
Captain employed a valuable tool for reaching into all
areas of American society.
Baker concluded that war conditions in Europe in
the fall of 1914 would necessarily increase the number of
immigrants coming to the new North Dakota land.

With tha

premise, Raker urg^i his customers to buy at the present
moment:
We expect a considerable increase in immigration,
owing to the high price of grain and all other farm
products and the extremely low price of farm land at
this time; also there will no doubt be an unusually
large number of immigrants to this country and no
doubt to North Dakota, owing to war conditions in
Europe, all of which will of necessity cause a
considerable advance in the price of lands in the
very near future.
The Captain had no way of looking into the futcre and
seeing that such would not be the case, nor ccaid he
possibly foresee the disastrous grain crops 4 .at would
plague western North Dakota in the second half of the
1910-1920 decade and the next two decades to come.*
.
I
12'Letter, Baker to N. B. Pladsen, Dec. 9, 1914,
I. P. Baker Papers, Box 88, Folder 1.

14

The price of Baker's farm and ranchland varied as
demand rose or feil,

Similarly, the method of payment

varied not only with the economic conditions of the time,
but also, and more important, with the economic conditions
of the Bismarck Realty Company.

As Baker noted:

"The

price is subject to change and the land subject to sale
without notice."

In 1910 good, reasonably flat farmland

brought Baker twenty dollars per acre.

If a farmer could

not pay cash, which invariably proved to be the case,
one-third of the amount would be accepted in cash, with
the balance tc be paid in one, two, or three years, with
a charge of six per cent interest.

Baker held a mortgage

on the land until it could be paid for by the farmer.

13

In 1911 Baker's corporation raised the price of
choice farmland to twenty-three dollars per acre.

How

ever, he now demanded only one-fourth of the price in
cash, with the balance payable in one, two, three, or
four years, with the same charge of six per cent interest.
This price applied to unbroken, virgin prairie land.

In

certain instances land had been rented out and was
broken and cropped.

For this land Baker charged extra,

"according to the amount expended in calHvsfinn/ 14
The Bismarck Realty Company after 1910 started
"* -V

i->Letter, Baker to Daniels and Jones Co., Mar. 3,
1910, I. P. Baker Papers, Box 88, Folder 1.
*"Letter, Baker to Henry A. Carroll, May 12
I. P. Baker Papers, Box 88, Folder 1.

,1911,
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renting land which it could not sell.

This proved

beneficial to the company in the beginning because the
company could make money on ccreage that would otherwise
remain idle.

In this procedure, the corporation ass :med

all the financial risks with the renter assuming
responsibility only for his labor.

The Bismarck Realty

Company paid the renter three dollars per acre to "break
and roll the land, put in the seed, harvest and thresh
the crop, and deliver one-haIf of it to our order on
board cars at nearest railroad station."

Baker furnished

the seed, usually flaxseed, and paid one-half the cost of
threshing.

Along with his payment of three dollars per

acre for his labors, the farmer received one-half of the
1=
grain. " As long as the price of grain remained high and
the yields also remained reasonably high, .both parties
benefited.

With low prices and poor yields, however, the

corporation suffered the greatest loss financially, since
it had paid the farmer three dollars per acre for
cultivation, furnished the seed, and paid one-half of the
threshing bill.

The farmer suffered also by not

receiving a large amount of grain, but his main
investment had been his labor and not his life's savings.
Crop rentals lasted for only one reason, with
renewal depending upon whether or not the tract was sold.
Prospective buyers could, and often did, purchase land
“^Letter, Baker to Leonard Posey, T^iay 3, 1911,
I. P. Baker Papers, Box 83, Polder 1.

16

■then under the share-crop system.

In such instances*

Baker sold the land* usually at a price ranging from
twenty to twenty-five dollars per acre.

In addition* the

prospective buyer was also charged for the work that had
been expended in preparing the land for seeding.

The

company's half share of the crop went to the new owner.

1£

When the crop was good* the prospective buyer received a
reasonably satisfactory deal* for flax after 1910 usually
sold for over two dollars per bushel.

Also advantageous

for the farmer was land that had already been broken and
had proven itself capable of good yields.

From the

company's point of view* it had recovered its investment
in the land in full, in addition to a highly favorable
price for its land.

In the whole process# the new buyer

lost in the event of a crop failure, as did the displaced
renter who had to find new land to rent or buy.
Many times grating land was offered for rental
when prospective buyers could not be found.

In these

instances# the hay privileges were sold to various farmers
or other interested parties.

For several years the North

Dakota State Penitentiary in Bismarck rented Baker
hayland around the Bismarck area.*
17
He A » r 1 v
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^Leeter. Baker to Dan'1 D. Smith, Apr. 23, 1914,
I. ?. Baker Papers, Box 88, Folder 1.
17Letter, North Dakota State Penitentiary to
Bismarck Realty Co., June 12, 1919, I. P. Baker Papers,
Box 88, Folder 1.
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practice of contracting the farmers' grain.

Under this

arrangement, the Captain loaned money to fanners in the
winter or early spring with the farmers agreeing to sell
their grain to Baker's various elevators along the
Missouri River in the coming fall.

3a ke^ charged eight

per cent interest on these early payments to farmers.
This scheme did not work, since many of the farmers in
1910 were "not in need of money bad enough to pay 8%
interest on the money."

18

This method became more

effective towards the middle of the decade with the
advent of poor crops and a shortage of money among the
farmers.
Development of the traction engine for breaking
prairie land in the early twentieth century revolu
tionized farming on the threat Plains.

Huge steam engines

and steel plows broke enormous acreages, compared to the
eld horse and one-bottom iron plow,

A number of concerns

offered their land-breaking services to the Bismarck
Realty Company.

With the increasing number of these

traction engines and the plentiful labor supply, Baker
offered to pay only two dollars and fifty cents per acre
for the breaking, rolling, and disking of his land.

The

proffered price also depended upon whether the brpaVinn
took place by hire or under a crop-share agreement.
Baker stated:
Letter, Fred Krause, Jr., to Baker, Dec. 7, 1910,
I. P. Baker Papers, Box 92, Folder 4.

18
When breaking is done by hire and no crop share
agreement is made, it is worth from $2.50 to $3.00
per acre in this vicinity, but when it is done in
---.cvtion with putting in the crop and receiving
a share of the proceeds, $2.50 per acre is a fair
r \ ir i
Jb. W

A W J.

* 4*
X y
JL V •

Baker could increase the value of his corporation's land
by having the land tilled because, once broken, it could
easily be cultivated by farmers with smaller implements.
By 1916 the price of grain had dropped, and Baker
lowered his original three dollar payment for breaking
and preparing the soil for his renters.

In 1916 Baker

agreed to pay fifty cents an acre for plowing land that
had already been broken.

Baker's company would also

furnish the necessary seed, pay one-half of the threshing
bill, and pay for hauling its own share to market.

The

same agreement could also be made for land that had never
been broken, with the exception that two dollars and
20
fifty cents would be paid for the breaking. *

Thus, in

1916 Baker's top price paid for breaking land amounted to
only two dollars and fifty cents per acre, while in 1911
he had paid three dollars per acre for preparing any land
for seed, regardless of the previous state of the land.
The falling price of wheat and flax, along with the
dimnisnxng yields oi sisiaxi

Cx.ops m

western

North Dakota, necessitated lower payments for plowing.
~^Letter, 3aker to Chisman and Conboy, Mar. 31,
1911, I. P. Baker Papers, Box 88, Folder 1.
“^Letter, Baker to Boyd Bros., Mar* 31, 1916,
I. P. Baker Papers, Box 88, Folder 4.

Unable to buy land, many farmers grudgingly accepted
Baker’s terms because there was no alternative.
jntinuing worsuuii3 of the economic situation
during 1917 forced Baker to take even more drastic action.
Baker notified one of his agents that
while we are aware of that in the past we have paid
from 50C to $1.00 an acre for plowing, this was when
wheat was worth from 7 5d to $1.00 a bushel, and the
seed required to seed an acre did not exceed $1.50
an acre, and adding to this $1.00 for plowing made
about $2.50 which we had in.ested in actual money,
and of course the land, whose value has gone up
considerably the past few years. Now conditions are
changed, fco seed an acre in wheat now costs us from
$3.50 to $4.50, which is practically $1.00 more than
the seed and plowing cost us in the past.
With this explanation, Baker urged his agent to explain
why the company could no longer pay one dollar an acre
for plowing.

He did agree to pay the farmers fifty cents

an acre for "plowing and preparing the soil for seed,
provided we get a crop." *

In 1915 the average yield of

wheat per acre in Burleigh County had been twenty-one
bushels per acre.

In 1916 the average yield dropped to a

paltry six bushels per acre.

In Morton County the yield
22
in 1916 averaged five bushels per acre.
Baker, who

could not afford two crop failures in succession, took
the only steps available, under the circumstances, at the
expense of the farmers.

Crop conditions did not improve,

and the 1915 level of wheat production would not be*
2
71

“ Letter, Baker to VI. O. ”asford, Mar. 22, 1917,
I. P. Baker Papers, Box 88, Folder 3.
22
“Lass, Steamboating, p. 165.

20
reached for over a decade, which proved much too late for
Baker and his corporation.
The Bismarck Realty Company in its first years
did not employ salesmen; it advertised its real estate in
daily papers. 71

Later it advertised in various farm

journals and magazines.

Advertisements in numerous

ethnic publications, such as German or Swedish newspapers,
produced some response.

Baker eventually realized the

need to hire real estate salesmen.

He soon contacted

real estate agencies in such cities as Minneapolis to
assist in the disposition of the corporation's land.

In

a letter to Kensail-Darnielle Company of Minneapolis,
Baker stated:

"We have no agent for our lands in

Minneapolis, in fact [wej have no Agents anywhere.

How

ever, we would be glad to have you handle these lands for
us on commission."

The Minneapolis company would receive

a commission of one dollar per acre for all land sold
through its efforts, with the price of the farmland
ranging from twenty to twenty-five dollars per acre.
Tracts of land varied as to tillability and levelness,
hence, the discrepancy in price.2
24
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inducements to agents in other areas of the country.

It

22Letter, Nebraska Farm Journal to Bismarck Realty
Co., Mar. 30, 1916, I. P. Baker Papers, Box 88, Folder 3.
24Letter, Baker to Kensail-Darnielle Co., Mar. 17,
1914, I. P. Baker Papers, Box 88, Folder 1.
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offered to pay the railroad fare of an agent in Potasi,
Wisconsin, with as few as two prospective customers, to
Garrison, North Dakota, and bar'

<-o

ihrs offer

was made only upon the condition that a sale or sales
took place.

In addition to his railroad fare refund, an

agent received a commission of two dollars per acre for
all land sold to the customers.^

The salesman alone

took the risk in such an arrangement, since he would be
out his railroad fare and time if no sale could be made.
The company and Baker undertook no monetary risk.
The feasibility of raising a profitable crop in
arid western North Dakota did not gain instant, wide
spread acceptance.

When contacted by the Captain’s

office, one real estate company responded:

"From what

we know of the locality, where your lands are, the land
generally is pretty Punk stuff, and a man is taking long
cnances on getting anything out of a crop."

The letter

went on to state that "we have half a dozen fellows right
here in Ransom Co. £ n .D.3 that dropped their wads in that
same locality last year, and that country has a pretty
26
black eye around here."
The crop of 1915 had been particularly good with
whecit yields in Burleigh County averaging twenty-one*
2
25

Letter, Baker to Clarence Eversoil, Apr. 24,
1914, I. P. Baker Papers, Box 88, Folder 2.
26
Letter, Chisman and Conboy to Bismarck Realty
Co., Mar. 31, 1911, I. P. Baker Papers, Box 88, Folder 1.

bushels per acre.""'

Even with such a successful crop the

past fall, sales of farmland in the spring of 1916
appeared small for the Captain who explained that "demand
for land just now is not exceptionally brisk and there is
2q
not much of any movement."
By t-ht rail of 1921 wheat yields had dwindled to
an average of less than six bushels per acre in Burleigh
County.2^

The farmers, necessarily, suffered and could

not afford to buy land, nor could they scratch out an
acceptable existence by renting.

Baker scarcely paid for

the seed supplied to his share-crop tenants, which cost
considerably more per bushel than the grain received in
return.

The Captain contemplated renting his land

without furnishing seed and without paying hxs renters
for plowing and working the soil.

The company received

firm advice from one of its agents not to undertake such
a practice.

N. J. Hubbard adamantly advised that "if we

don’t furnish the seed, I do not believe that we can rent
1 acre for next season.

There is no seed left here and

no money to get it."*
282
9 Poor crops, low prices, and a
tight economy for the western North Dakota farmers
?7

Lass, steamhoating, p. 165.

28Letter, Baker to Mrs. A. W. Ziegler, May 2, 1916,
I. P. Baker Papers, Box 88, Folder 3.
29 Lass, Steamboating, p. 165.
j8Letter, N. J. Hubbard to Bismarck Realty Co.,
Nov. 1, 1921, I. P. Baker Papers, Box 89, Folder 1.
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played havoc with both the farmer and Isaac P. Baker's
Bismarck Realty Company,
Once Baker had rented his land to various farmers,
he still maintained an interest in the way crops matured,
since a better yield meant a larger profit for him on his
one-half interest in the crop.
owned land.

A number of renters also

As could be expected, they tended their own

land more closely than the rented land.

Baker, also

aware of this, cautioned his agents to "keep careful
watch over the different pieces of grain and -ae that it
is out as soon as it is ripe."

The Captain fully

realized that many of the renters "may need a little
prodding," but urged his agents to "keep right after them
and see that they take care of their crops right.”31
In the same manner, many farmers on Baker's
crop-share plan planted their own land first and seeded
their rented land after all of their own crops had been
seeded.

The Captain attempted to circumvent such

practices by stipulating "May 1st as the time in which
all work must be completed on wheat, barley, oats, etc.
contracts, and June 1st on flax contracts."

The agents

received warnings that late seeding only resulted in the
company's throwing away its seed money and money paid
for plowing.

Baker urged his agents to inform the

renters that "we require early work and that they must
31Letter, Baker to J. L. Fennie, Aug. 24, 1915,
I. P. Baker Papers, Box 88, Folder 3.

24
start in on our land as soon as the weather opens up and
32
permits work in the field."
When the grain on rented land reached the
threshing machine in the fall, the renters hauled it to
one of Baker's many elevators located along the Missouri
River north of Bismarck.

These elevators operated under

the Bismarck Elevator and Investment Company, of which
Baker was principal owner.

Since these elevators main

tained a virtual monopoly in this part of the state,
Baker could, and did, pay almost any price he desired for
grain.

The only competitive elevator sites existed in

various railroad towns, far distant from his river
elevators.

When the farmers hauled Baker’s share of the

grain to his elevators, they a^so sold their own shares.
Many began to complain about the low price they received
at these points as compared to prices paid in railroad
towns.

The fact that the Captain had originally promised

to pay the same price for grain as did elevators on
railroads angered many farmers.

Many farmers eventually

refused to sell their own grain to Baker's elevators,
which resulted in one of Baker's agents informing the
Captain that "the way things lock here to me now is that
if we do not pay close to Underwood j_a railroad townj
prices that we will not buy much grain at this point this
^Letter, Baker to Basford, Mar. 10, 1917
Baker Papers, Box 88, Folder 4.
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season." 33
With the poor crops year after year, many of the
farmers who had purchased land from Baker could not make
payments on their mortgage at the agreed time.

Many

requested permission to pay the interest for the year
and carry over the principal until the next fall.

Others

requested permission to pay the interest and part of the
principal.

The remainder simply could not pay anything

and asked to be carried over until the subsequent fall,
ihc uismarcx Reaity Company had obligations of its own to
meet and could not carry anyone for another growing
season.
« it
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Baker saw no alternative but to request full

payment of principal and interest, "or else the matter
will be placed in the hands of our attorneys for
attention with instructions to foreclose and take
judgment against them."3"* Such a harsh stand met with
widespread disapproval of the farmers, who were primarily
concerned with feeding and clothing their families and
only secondarily interested in paying off a mortgage on
terms which they deemed too steep.

The majority of the

farmers did get their mortgage renewed because the time*
.
I
33Letter, T. W. Hopkins to Baker, Sept. 25, 1916,
I. P. Baker Papers, Box 88, Folder 3.
"^Letter, Baker to Krause, Dec. 12, 1913, I. P.
Baker Papers, Box 92, Folder 6.
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ana money involved in foreclosing such a vast number of
mortgages would have defeated the company’s purpose.
The Bismarck Realty Company's capital stock and
bonds totaled $25,000 in 1918.^3 From that moment on,
until the company's last financial report in 1933, it was
plagued by hard times.

Bad crops had cursed the farmers'

and the Captain’s land after 1916.

But, as 1919 neared,

crop conditions went from bad to worse.

Drought had been

responsible for the majority of the poor yields up to
1919.

However, in 1919 a new calamity descended upon

Baker's farmland.
Captain:

One cf Baker's agents informed the

"I was looking at it yesterday £some of Baker's

land] and the black rust has taken it.

It is

absolutally ^sicj worthless, it won't be worth cutting as
there is nothing in the head.”
N. J. Hubbard, another agent for the Bismarck
Realty Company, reported similarly poor crops on Baker's
rented land in the fail of 1913.

He estimated that the

wheat in some sections would not run over three to three
and one-half bushels per acre.

In this instance, drought

and grasshopper infestations assumed the major respon
sibility for the poor crops.
hod decided ec1I
"
.

The renters on this land

t-h#= arain because it would not be

35
Memorandum, Oct. 21, 1919, I. P. Baker Papers,
Box 88, Folder 5.
■^Letter, G. W. Galbrath to Baker, Aug. 6, 1919,
I. P. Baker Papers, Box 88, Folder 5.
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economically feasible for them to do so.37

Thus, Baker

and his company had absolutely nothing to show for the
seed they had furnished and for the cost of plowing.
Similar situations throughout the remainder of the
company's land continued to gnaw at the organization's
vitals.
Poor crops continued, and more farmers suffered
from the inability to pay on the mortgages held by the
Bismarck Realty Company.

Thus, if the mortgages did not

reach the foreclosure courts, the company assumed them.
As of December 20, 1022, it hao over $28,000 in notes
bearing its own endorsement.

The company, in similar

situations, had accumulated past due notes of its own
totaling over $10,000.3S
By 1922 the Bismarck Realty Company had reached
the end of its major business activities in JJorth Dakota.
The majority of its land no longer remained in demand.
Baker had. reached the age of sixty-seven, and he no
longer could maintain an iron grip over all his financial
interests.

Afte«. 1922 the records of the company and its

activities «'*»ase.

On December 22, 1923, the company did

renew its application for incorporation, yet no trace of
i to business avlivities nereatuar exists.

The author isI
.

Letter, Hubbard to Benton Baker, Aug. 4, 1919,
I. P. Baker Papers, 3ox 38, Polder 5.
0
Letter, to Bismarck Realty Co., Dec. 20, 1922,
Box 8 9 , Folder 1 .
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led to conclude that any business activities hereafter
existed in a perfunctory nature.
On July 19, 1933, the Bismarck Realty Company
filed its last domestic corporation report with the North
Dakota Secretary of State.

This report stated that

Isaac P. Baker served as president of the corporation,
and his daughter, Julia B. Leach, served as secretary and
treasurer.

At the time o? its filing, the business

claimed a capital stock value of $100,000.35

Since no

further corporation reports were filed after this period,
cancellation of its corporation charter resulted.

It is

quite possible that Baker and other members of his family
divided the property of the former corporation and
attended to its various holdings in their own manner.
The real estate company existed in an exciting
period of North Dakota history.

The time was one of

growth for North Dakota and of the opening up of much cf
the stare's virgin land.

Baker and his company

experienced prosperity and disaster along with many of
the settlers.

Drought, insect infestation, and other

calamities plagued Baker's company and the farmers of the
area.

Through it all the Bismarck Realty Company stood

as an example of a pioneer North Dakota firm striving to
make a profit in the real estate business and, at the
same time, provide farming and grazing land for the
39
Letter from Ben Meier, North Dakota Secretary
of State, Bismarck Aug. 24, 1972.
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influx of settlers

CHAPTER III
BISMARCK ELEVATOR AND INVESTMENT COMPANY.
Although the creator of several business firms,
Baker did not find the Bismarck Elevator and Investment
Company, so long associatad with his name.

It had been

incorporated and functioning for a few years before Baker
became involved in its operation in a superficial manner.
However, the company eventually came under the control of
the Captain and, together with Baker's Benton Packet
Company, functioned as one of the largest and most
important of all of Baker’s pioneer North Dakota
businesses.
Originally known as the Bismarck Elevator Company,
it was incorporated on July 28, 1882, in Bismarck, seven
years before statehood.

The purpose of its formation

included "the building£,J m a i n t a i n i n g a n d operating
of grain elevators at Bismarck and other points along the
Northern Pacific Railroad in Dakota Territory,” together
with ::tne buying [,] selling [,] storing £,J and shipping of
grain at Bismarck and other points'* along the Missouri
River.

Bismarck served as its principal place of

business.

Five men served as directors of the company:

Robert Macnider, M. P. Slattery, Dean Eisenberg,

30

31
Georgs H. Fairchild, and H. R. Torter, all of Bismarck.
Capital stock of the company amounted to $10,000 divided
into 100 shares valued at $100 each.^
Records are not available to determine the
activities of the Bismarck Elevator Company in the first
decade of its existence, nor to determine the distri
bution of shares among its five original directors.

It

appears that the young Baker began working for the
company as a clerk in the mid 1880's.

By 1889 he had

become general superintendent of the corporation, and by
the 1890's general manager of the business.

At a meeting

held on December 5, 1893, the Great Western Elevator
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eight year old Baker as its Bismarck Resident Agent.

In

this position the Captain served as chief grain buyer for
the Great Western Elevator Company which bought much of
its grain from the Bismarck Elevator Company, of which
Baker operated as general manager.*
2

The Minneapolis

company also sold grain for the Bismarck Elevator on a
commission basis.

It appears that when the twenty-year

corporate existence of the Bismarck Elevator Company
»
in *
JL Jf \J 4U

Lilts JLj.£i!l dinu

renamed it.

the Bismarck Elevator and Investment Company.

Under his

f

p u x v liao cu

^Letter from Ben Meier, North Dakota Secretary of
State, Bismarck, Sept. 18, 1972.
2

Letter, Win. D. Sammis to Baker, Dec. 20, 1893,
I. P. Baker Papers, Box 49, Folder 1.
if
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direction, the company continued to expand and was
responsible for the creation of the Expansion Lumber and
Mercantile Company in 1906.
Through his grain buying concern in Bismarck, the
Captain for the next two decades virtually controlled the
buying of small grain along the Missouri River north of
Bismarck at points not yet reached by the railroad.
Elevators and warehouses erected at such points ranged in
capacity from 10,000 to 100,000 bushels.

The purchased

grain was spouted onto boats and barges and floated to
Bismarck or Washburn where a marine .leg elevator
transferred it directly into railroad cars which carried
it to terminal markets in Minneapolis or Duluth.
Depending upon crop conditions, one-half to three-quarters
of a million bushels might be transported annually.3
In conjunction with the elevators, 3aker main
tained small general stores.

These served the lumber and

hardware needs of the farmers of the area.

The g r a m

which was hauled away by boat was transported by the
Benton Packet Company, a line of boats which had been
purchased by Baker and his occasional financial backer,
Montana businessman and politician, T. C. Power.

These

boats could haul lumber and other hardware to the various
elevator sites on their way from Bismarck and return full
with grain to Bismarck or Washburn.

Simultaneously, the

3I. P. Baker Papers, Folder 534.
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Senton Packet Company and the Eismarck Elevator and
Investment Company benefited with an increase in grain
trade and an increase in the lumber and hardware
business.

In 1906, with the incorporation of the

Expansion Lumber and Mercantile Company, the greater part
of the lumber and hardware business of the Bismarck
Elevator and Investment Company came under the direction
of another Baker enterprise.
In the period from 1906 to 1920, the Bismarck
Elevator and Investment Company operated at Elbowoods and
Berthold in McLean County; at Ree, Expansion, Mannhaven,
Stanton, and Deapolis in Mercer County? and at Sanger and
Washburn in Oliver County.

All of the operations were on

or near the Missouri River north of Bismarck.
elevator stood at many of the sites.

Only the

Some places, such

as Ree and Expansion, had, in addition to the elevator, a
post office and general store with one or two houses.

In

most instances, these locations existed in lonely,
untouched areas of the North Dakota plains where it was
possible for the farmers to sell their grain and purchase
such things as lumber and hardware.
The Captain had two ways of making a profit on
the grain trade of the area.

First of all, in the usual

way, he purchased the grain from the farmers at rates
below the Duluth and Minneapolis market price, usually

34
twenty-four cents below their prices.45 When Baker sold
che grain to the Great Western Grain Company, or had them
sell it on commission in Minneapolis or Duluth, with
freight taken out, he usually realized a profit.

His

second way of making a profit might well be called paying
himself, because the g r a m on its way to market traveled
in part on the Benton Packet line owned by Baker.

The

grain traveled from the elevator sites on packet boats to
either Washburn or Bismarck and the rest of the way by
railroad.

The rate for flax from the elevator sites to

Duluth or Minneapolis was about twenty-two cents per
hundredweight.

Of this charge, the Benton Packet Company

received as its share eight cents per hundredweight.^
With this arrangement, the Captain noticeably increased
the business of another one of his companies with
resultant additional profits.

Similarly, when Baker

ordered merchandise for his lumber and hardware stores,
he urged the various companies to specify routing for the
shipments to the elevator sites "as this is absolutely
necessary in order to give us the benefit of through
joint carload rate of S00 Line and Benton Packet Co.
4
Letter, Baker to J. Robert Mann, Sept. 13, 1899,
I. P. Baker Papers, 240, Letter Press Book 41 for
Bismarck Elevator Co., p. 31.
5
Letter, Baker to Great Western Grain Co.,
Nov. 25, 1916, I. P. Baker Papers, Box 47, Folder 4,
^Letter, Baker to Cutler-Magner Co., Apr. 12,
1915, I. P. Baker Papers, Box 46, Folder 3.
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Kith this arrangement, Baker could make a profit on goods
shipped in, since he paid his own company tor hauling
them.
Throughout the years, the grain market price
fluctuated widely.

Many reasons accounted for this, not

all of them legitimate.

As early as 1899 the Great

Western Grain Company of Minneapolis informed Baker that
the flax market was an entirely manipulated market,
"apparently being handled by Albert Dickinson, of Chicago,
who is thought to represent the American Linseed Co."
Though the American Linseed Company created a great demand
for flaxseed, it had at the same time the power "to
advance or reduce the price 5 or 10 cents any day if they
feel so disposed."^

In 1907, when the October panic

gripped the American economy, the price of flax remained
low because of the low amount of construction and
manufacturing anticipated in the forthcoming year.

Even

though the previous crop had been below average in yield,
rumors of anticipated weak economic progress had rendered
O
the market price for flax quite low.
The wheat market similarly showed wide fluctu
ations in price throughout the years.

In the spring of

1907 the wheat price accelerated greatly with the news
^Letter, H. F. Douglas to Bismarck Elevator Co.,
Oct. 28, 1899, I. P. Baker Papers, Box 40, Folder 1.
^Letter, Douglas to Baker, Dec.,, 1907, X. P.
Baker Papers, Box 41, Folder 3.
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that the green bug infestation had destroyed much of the
winter wheat crop in Texas, Oklahoma, and Kansas.

The

bug had worked its way northward, and reports of its
arrival in Nebraska could be heard.9*
2 In 1914, and indeed
1
until its conclusion, the first World War greatly
influenced the wheat market.

By September 1914 wheat

traders became convinced that the war would not be brought
to the expected rapid conclusion, and the market remained
strong for a time.^9

H. F. Douglas, of the Great western

Elevator Company, mentioned to the Captain in the spring
of 1915 that rumors of war developments were again
influencing prices.

"The rapid decline in the market for

a week past has been due largely to rumors of peace
negotiations and the possibility of the Dardanelles being
opened so that the Russian wheat can be gotten to
market.In

the same month, rumors spread that Italy

would soon enter the war on the Allied side and hasten the
end of the war, causing a weakening of grain options which
IO
resulted in lower prices.
In 1916 the story was no
different.

In February the Russians had made some headway

against the Turks, which led many grain traders to
9Ibid., May 11, 1907.
"^Letter, Douglas to Baker, Sept. 16, 1914, I. P.
Baker Papers, Box 45, Folder 4.
■^Letter, Douglas to Baker, Mar. 5, 1915, I. P.
Baker Papers, Box 46, Folder 4.
12Ibid., Mar. 22, 1915.
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speculate that the latter might "sue for peace and result
in the reopening of the Dardenelles
in the Russian wheat."^

[sA=]

which would let

^s a result of persistent

rumors throughout the war, the wheat market never reached
a point of stability prior to American entry into the war.
In most instances it remained quite low, in turn causing
Baker's company to pay a low price to the farmers.
Many of the problems faced by the Bismarck
Elevator and Investment Company developed from troubles
surrounding Baker's grain buyers.

The Captain experienced

difficulty in securing them, finding the particular type
he needed, and holding them once they were found.
to put up with many poor agents.

He had

Baker usually asked the

Great Western Elevator Company of Minneapolis to secure
agents for him.

As early as 1906 the latter was claiming:

"We have never had such a hard time to secure agents."
Even with salaries higher than in previous years, grain
buyers could scarcely be found.

In certain instances,

men employed as grain buyers stayed at their new stations
14
only a week before being hired away by somebody else.
Baker's trouble in securing grain buyers may have
been caused by the type of men he sought.

In 1912 he

wanted men who were Germans or "capable of speaking
t'“'Letter, Douglas to Baker, Feb. 19, 1916, I. P.
Baker Papers, Box 47, Folder 4.
^Letter, Great Western Elevator Co. to Bismarck
Elevator and Investment Co., Aug. 25, 1996, I. P. Baker
Papers, Box 41, Folder 2.
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German as our territory is almost wholly settled by
farmers speaking that language."15

In 1914 Baker still

desired German-speaking grain buyers.
criterion was added.

However, a new

The Northern Pacific Railroad had

reached previously unsettled areas of the region along
the Missouri River north of Bismarck.

With its entry

into the territory, new towns with new elevators entered
the grain trade.

Baker faced something he had previously

been virtually immune from— competition.

His agents

needed the ability to buy successfully "grain in
competition with points along the new line of the
Northern Pacific west from Stanton to Golden Valley."

16

In the summer and early fall of 1915 the Great
Western Elevator Company experienced problems in holding
agents once they had been hired for Baker.

Many of the

new men received offers of higher wages from other grain
purchasers throughout the area who "seem to think that
the fine crop prospects justify the paying of almost any
wages."

These elevators offered from $109 to $150 per

month for the best men.

This compared with the

Captain's salary offerings of from $60 to $90 per month.
The conditions in which Baker's grain buyers lived would*
1
^Letter, Baker to Douglas, 'ruly 26, 1912, I. P.
Baker Papers, Box 44, Folder 2.
1^Letter, Baker to Great Western Grain Co.,
July 26, 1912, I. P. Baker Papers, Box 44, Folder 2.
-^Letter, Douglas to Baker, Aug. 17, 1915, I. P.
Baker Papers, Box 46, Folder 5.
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have been reason enough for them to leave.

One agent

reported:
I am now with the Bismarck Elevator & Investment
Co., but am out on the Missouri River about on fsicl
hundred miles west of Bismarck where this [sicj is no
railroad, post office, phone, bank, or boarding house.
I want to get out of here if possible.*8
Conditions throughout most of Baker’s other elevator
sites remained the same.

Agentc with families found no

schools for their children and, in certain instances, the
buyer had to reside in the elevator.
Some of the Captain’s grain buyers did not always
carefully ioa^ the grain for final shipment to market.
The Great Western Grain Company warned Baker that "if you
will pardon the criticism, we think some of your men dc
not exercise very good judgment in loading their grain."
They had been mixing spots of poor grain in a load of
good grain, hoping it would go unnoticed.

H. F. Douglas

of Great Western Grain warned that the milling companies
which purchased the grain knew of such arrangements and,
when discovered, paid for the entire load at the price of
the poor wheat.

Douglas stated that "it was too bad to

have a loss of 3d per bushel on the whole car because
o f the appa rent set-up."A 3
Some flax received shipment in similar set-ups.
^Letter, Robert Rawlins to Great Western Grain Co.,
June 28, 1915, I. P. Baker Papers, Box 46, Folder 3.
-^Letter-, Douglas to Baker, June 28, 1912, I. P.
Baker Papers, Box 44, Folder 1.
•>
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Damp flax stored in the various elevators heated and
caked.

Rather than removing the caked flax, the various

grain buyers scattered it throughout the load for
shipment.

Several loads of such flax were received in

Minneapolis from the Captain's elevators in the spring of
20
1912.
Most of the elevators along the Missouri River
did not have cleaning facilities.

In o.’C instance, an

agent had run sort© wheat on top of oats and had shipped
it to Minneapolis.

On its arrival, the entire car had to

be cleaned, and the Bismarck Elevator and Investment
Company assumed the. cost of the procedure.
There were numerous instances of grain
deteriorating when it was stored in elevators.

Baker

explained to his agentst
Much of our wheat now going on the market is grading
M-G (No Grade) on account of being tough, bin burnt
and in some instances sour, and in consequence is
selling at heavy discounts. As our records do not
show that grain was bought while in this condition
we naturally conclude that notwithstanding our
repeated warning to agents, the grain was allowed
to heat in the bins.
When grain that had been bought at the number one price
received only a l,N’o Grade” rating upon final sale in
20
** Letter, Great Western Grain Co. to Baker,
July 31, 1912, I. P. Baker Papers, Box 43, Folder 5.
-•-Letter, Baker to Great Western Elevator Co. ,
Nov. 5, 1908, I. P. Baker Papers, Box 41, Folder 4.
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Minneapolis, the company lost money.

7*>

Baker blamed his

agents for the losses.
Buying low grade wheat proved hazardous for Baker.
The milling companies .in Minneapolis could use some low
grade wheat mixed with good wheat for the produ cion of
flour.

However, with large quantities of low grade wheat

from various areas reaching the market at the same time,
Baker reported:

"It is hard to find buyers for this kind

of wheat."^3
On numerous occasions a discrepancy existed
between the weight of the railroad cars at the shipping
point in Washburn or Bismarck and their destination ir
Minneapolis or Duluth.

Baker maintained a steady corre

spondence with Soo Line officials about the weight
shortages of his cars at terminal points.

He alluded to

the possibility that his scales at Washburn could be
inaccurate but maintained that the scales had been tested
frequently by an ex-state Scale Examiner.

The only

conclusion Baker could arrive at was "that your
destination weights are not correct, or your company
loses some grain out of almost every car."

Baker finally

admonished that*
.
I
Memorandum, Baker to All Agents of Bismarck
Elevator and Investment Co., June 5, 1913, I. P. Baker
Papers, Box 44, Folder 4.
^Letter, Baker to A. K. Grube, Oct. 5, 1911,
I. P. Baker Papers, 248, Letter Press Book 51 for
Bismarck Elevator and Investment Co., p. 399.

4?

there is always a chance for honest variation between
scales but when systematic stealing is practiced on
thousands of cars of grain it must stop when applied
to Missouri River shipments of grain weighed by the
Benton Packet Company at Washburn, No. Dakota. ^
The discrepancy in weights meant losses for Baker.
urgently advised rectification of the situation.

He
At one

point, in reference to a car that had been shipped to
Duluth, the Captain informed Soo Line officials at Duluth
that "the difference in the net weight of this car at
destination and the net weight at point of shipping will
preclude further shipment to Duluth on our part."

Baker

continually maintained that accurate weights had been
supplied by his agents and that "it is possible that there
is QsicJ some loop holes at R. R. stations between here
25
and Duluth that will require radical treatment."
The scales at Washburn may have been accurate and
trouble-free, but the Captain had problems with his
scales at his other elevator sites.

One of his agents,

R. Rawlins, complained that the poor manner in which
scales had been installed at his elevator was ruining his
business.

Rawlins further exclaimed:

"We cannot redeem

business when a stranger drives on your scale and it
drops into the sca’e pit."

Rawlins claimed the scale had

been installed by non-mechanics whose work did not hold*
.
I
Letter, Baker to A. E. Hodson, June 9, 1911,
I. P. Baker Papers, Box 43, Folder 3.
■^Letter, Baker to Great Western Elevator Co.,
Oct. 8, 1908, I. P. Baker Papers, Box 41, Folder 4.
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Early in 1909 the farmers in the area began
complaining about prices paid hy Baker's elevators} they
were lower than those in other areas.

Emile Carlson, an

agent for the company, so informed the Captain:
The farmers are very discontent around here
regarding our prices on wheat and prices paid in
Washburn. Last Saturday it was 8<? difference and on
acct. of it we are losing a lot of wheat that would
normally come here with the prices right.27
Baker continued his practice of paying the farmers prices
under what they would be paid at railroad points.

In the

fall of 1910 the farmers again complained that his
elevators paid from two to four cents less on wheat and
from three to five cents less on flax than could be
received at Ree.

At Hebron the price was from twelve to

fourteen cents higher on wheat and fifteen to sixteen
cents higher on flax.

In this case, many farmers decided

to make the two-day trip to Hebron to sell their grain
pp
rather than take such a price cut.
The days when Baker
could virtually dictate the price he would pay for grain
were rapidly drawing to a close.
By 1914 Baker had been forced to have hisI
.
^Letter, Ravelins to Bismarck Elevator and
Investment Co., Ncv. 15, 1915, I. P. Baker Papers,
Box 47, Folder 1.
•^Letter, Emile Carlson to Baker, Nov. 2, 1909,
I. P. Baker Papers, Box 42, Folder 1.
•^Letter, Krause to Baker, Oct. 12, 1910, I. P.
Baker Papers, Box 43, Folder 1.
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elevators on the river, for a time being, pay one cent
above ehe price paid for grain at railroad points.

Baker

did not begrudge the price he had to pay because he
admitted that "the railroad elevators have far better
facilities than we have for getting the business, on
account of having retail stores."

The Capt a m did no*.

expect to get the farmers' grain next to railroad towns,
but he did expect to acquire all the grain along the
river at all hazards. 29
The Bismarck Elevator and Investment Company
faced additional problems because the price of grain
declined in the fall of 1915.

Some of the farmers who

normally sold to the company began storing grain on their
30
farms.
Added to this, many farmers desired storage
tickets from Baker's elevators.

31

In this method, farmers

had their grain stored by the elevators for a nominal fee
and sold their grain when the market price had risen.
Baker did not desire to issue storage tickets because he
felt it tied up the limited space his elevators did have.
The farmers became especially displeased, since railroad
elevators readily accepted grain on a storage basis.
29

Letter, Baker to Great Western Grain Co.,
Sept. 30, 1914, I. P. Baker Papers, Box 45, Folder 3.
■^Letter, L. M.
Investment Co., Sept.
Box 47, Folder 1.
-}t
■'■‘Letter, G. W.
Investment Co., Sept.
Box 46, Folder 4.

Leir to Bismarck Elevator and
19, 1915, I. P. Baker Papers,
Waldron to Bismarck Elevator and
28, 1915, I. P. Baker Papers,
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Baker still refused to issue storage tickets in
1916.

He also compelled his grain buyers to pay for each

load of grain as the farmers hauled it to the e..e/ator.
Many farmers voiced disapproval with this method, desiring
one check to be issued upon the completion of all their
grain hauling.

The Captain continued to lose business

because of his unaccommodating nature.

One of his agents

mentioned that many of his former large customers had
refused to sell to his elevator because no storage ticket
would be issued.

A number hauled their grain two miles

farther to market rather than haul it to Baker's elevators.
A number of farmers,
while they were not ready to sell wanted to take
advantage of the roads at the time, to haul thier [sicl
grain, they all wanted to come here. I wrote you and J
you refused to allow me to store for them, so we
lost at least the handling of 20,000 bu. there. 2
Through his own insistence, Baker had turned away a large
grain consignment because he had refused to grant the
farmers certain concessions that could easily be under
stood from the farmers' point of view.

Grain yields

began to drop after 1915 and Baker needed as much grain
as possible in order to maintain reasonable profits.
The condition of the Bismarck Elevator and
Investment Company's grain buying and storage facilities
also contributed to some of its loss.

The elevators

-^Letter, Waldron to Bismarck Elevator and
Investment Co., Jan. 12, 1916, I. P. Baker Papers,
Box 47, Folder 3.
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suffered primarily from poor construction and poor
upkeep.

A new agent, W. H. Crail, upon arriving in

Elbowoods, exclaimed:
things in very nr*or

"1 arrived here today and found
t

car.5

could leave a place like this.”

understand how anyone

He further mentioned

that the shed part of the elevator "would make a very
good corn crib but as holding grain, it is out of the
question." Other repairs had to
elevator could even expect to

be made before the
take in any grain.

The

chute which loaded grain from the elevator to the packet
boats had been broken.

He had promised farmers in the

area tc buy approximately 6,000 bushels of their oats.
But if he did, he would only have one bin left for wheat
34
and flax.
The only solution would have been for the
packet boats

to clean out the oats as fast as they

arrived, but

each passing day brought the fall freeze

nearer.

Such situations prevented Baker from taking in

all grain available for purchase.
Another agent, G. w. Waldron, experienced the
same frustrations at the Ree elevator.

In a letter to

Baker he explained the Ree situation:
You sure had some crack men looking after your
interests here, by the way things look. Elevator pit
rooted full of dirt, under pinning rooted out,I
.
“"Letter, W. H. Crail to Baker, Oct. 21, IS14,
I. P. Baker Papers, Box 46, Folder 2.
34Ibid., Oct. 23, 1914.

47
machinery & stock scattered from Hell to Texas,
hardware & machinery repairs, jumbled . . . . 1h
Conditions at Ree were duplicated at other, never.
.
locations.

Robert Rawlins, another agent working for

Baker, in referring to the Emmet elevator, declared:
"The new elevator you put up last summer is not in
condition to put grain in.”

The sill along the river

side of the elevator had been broken, as well as the
stringers on the elevator floor.

In such a condition the

floor settled as grain entered the bin,

Floors such as

these drew moisture and caused much of the grain to heat
and cake, resulting in a lower grade when finally sold to
Duluth or Minneapolis firms.

The grain at Barrow's

Landing suffered from poor housing.

Robert Rawlins, in

reference to this location, informed Baker that "the
building is not in shape to keep out the heavy rains we
are now getting and grain soon spoils in warm weather if
allowed to get wet."J

By November 1915 the Barrow's

Landing elevator had begun to spread apart at its base.
Rawlins urged Baker to send a repairman immediately,
"otherwise we will have to stop putting grain in this
■^Letter, Waldron to Bismarck Elevator and
Investment Co., Aug. 12, 1915, I. P. Baker Papers,
Box 47, Folder 2.
•^Letter, Rawlins to Bismarck Elevator and
Investment Co., Nov. 18, 1915, I. P. Baker Papers,
Box 47, Folder 1.
“'"ibid. , Sept. 25, 1915.
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-Jc
building.” "1' In the spring 1916 the elevator at Black
Water began to show signs of breaking out.

Flax had been

stored in the elevator during the winter months when the
packet boats could not be used to transport grain, on the
frozen river.

This stored flax had exerted heavy

pressure on the flimsy walls.

The agent warned Baker

that "if it should break there would be a big loss in
flax.,

1 am doing all 1 can. to save it but hope you will

get a boat up here as soon as they can run the river.”'’9
Overdue repairs of his elevators continued, to account for
the Captain's loss of business and also resulted in
certain amounts of spoilage of grain.
On several occasions the scales at elevators fell
into disrepair, and the farmers complained about receiving
faulty weights on the scales.

One agent, C. E . Hoffman,

once urgea the Captain to "fix it [the scale]] at once or
we may have to close till, it is fixed as the farmers are
finding a great amount of fault with it."
Hard rains oftentimes interferred with Baker’s
purchase of grain.

At such times, the dirt roads leading

to his various elevator locations became virtual
quagmires.

Baker attempted to alleviate the situation by

38Ibid., Nov. 15, 1915.
"better, C. E. Hoffman to Bismarck Elevator and
Investment Co., Apr. 5, 1916, I. P . Baker Papers,
•
f
t
Box 47, Folder 5.
4®Letter, Hoffman to Baker , Oct. 23, 1915, I. P.
Baker Papers, Box 46, Folder 4.
/
>jf

a.
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enlisting the services of the farmers for road work in
their less-busy periods of summer,

la 1916 Fred V, Dale?

a large landholder in the area, agreed to help repair
some of the roads leading to Baker's elevators.

Dale

anticipated a large crop for the coming fall and did not
wish to he prevented from marketing it by bad roads.

He

assured the Captain that he "would like to see that the
roads are fixed up in better shape than they were last
Fall, as the roads were practically imDossible there
part of the time."'*1
The Captain maintained an iron grip over the
activities of all his companies.

The Bismarck Elevator

and Investment Company received its directives from the
Captain.

Any deviation from his orders or any move made

without his approval met with a firm denunciation.

In

one instance an agent of the company hired an extra hand
at a rush period without first consulting Baker.
chastising the agent. Baker concluded:

After

"Hereafter if you

employ anyone without expressed authority from this office
you will have to pay them out of your own pocket,”^

On

another occasion he criticized an agent for purchasing
400 bushels of wheat because the agent had been ordered
^Letter, Fred V. Dale to Bismarck Elevator and
Investment Co., Mar. 28, 1916, I. P. Baker Papers,
Box 47, Polder 4.
‘
^'•Letter, Baker to Basford, May 21, 1918, I. P.
Baker Papers, Box 48, Folder 3-
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net to "take in any large lots for any one farmer without
first writing us about it."4'* Aware that they could do
nothing without first contacting him, many of Baker's
agents became disillusioned.

Some quit, and others lost

what little initiative they possessed.

The company

suffered because of the Captain’s firm control.

In many

cases Baker’s agents would have been better judges of
certain courses of action than their superior in his
Bismarck office.
Uncollected, unpaid accounts continued to cause
Baker much trouble.

Many farmers had their grain

contracted to the Captain.

In this situation they

received money for it in advance of the harvest.

As fall

arrived farmers hauled their grain, to Baker’s elevators
and repaid him with a charge of six to eight per cent
interest added,

with the advent of poor crops, the grain

the farmers raised was insufficient to pay off the loan.
Other farmers owed money to the general stores at the
elevator sites.

Very close ties linked the Expansion

Lumber and Mercantile Company, which owned many of the
stores, with the Bismarck Elevator and Investment
Company.

Baker repeatedly and forcefully urged his

agents to collect these unpaid accounts:

"You

practically have got to hound them to death in order to*
.
I
4'Letter, Baker to Mels Malinguist, Jan. 30, 1915,
I. P. Baker Papers, Box 46, Folder 5.

get your money out of them."

Baker knew that the best

time for collections came, when the farmers T auled their
grain to market.

At that time hie felt the company had its

best chance for collecting its accounts and warned:
“After they get through paying their threshing bill, we
come about es close to being in line for our pay as
anybody."^"'

As early as 1911, the large number of unpaid

accounts had prevented the company from, increasing the
stock of lumber in one of its yards.
Baker ordered:

To cut losses,

“Until we collect the accounts now

outstanding, you will sell for cash only, as we do not
care to put any more money in book accounts such as the
majority of those you now h a v e . T h r o u g h o u t

its

remaining years, the Bismarck Elevator and Investment
Company was the victim, of a plague of unco 11actable
accounts,

Nature's cruel hand dealt a crippling blow to

the grain yields in western North Dakota, and many of the
farmers could never hope to rid themselves of their debt
shackles.
Throughout the first two decades of the
twentieth century, the period of greatest activity by the1
’^Letter, Baker to Krause, Jan. 31, 19.13, I. P.
.Baker Papers, Box 43, Folder 2.
“rletter, Baker to A. W. Stoll, Oct. 8, 1913,
1. P, Baker Papers, Box 92, Folder 5.
^Letter, Baker to Benjamin Stoelting, Feb. 14,
1911, I. P. Baker Papers, 406, Kisc. "betters for Bismarck
Elevator and Investment Co., Book. 31, p. 137.
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elevator firm, grain yields in western North Dakota
varied greatly.

The company usually showed profits, but

poor yields continually cut into the magnitude of its
profits.

As early as 1900 poor crops affected the

business.

In that year the Captain concluded that '"we do

not expect to get much wheat along the river this year.
Crops are almost a total failure . . . .

There is so

little to buy that a man cannot even make poor wages on
commission." 47

he this early date the railroad had not

yet arrived in the area north of Bismarck.

Therefore,

Baker still maintained a virtual monopoly on the buying
of all grain in the area.

He could count on buying

virtually the entire grain crop in the area, which partly
compensated for the poorer yields.
In 1903 Minnesota and the two Dakotas again
suffered from poor crops.

Much worse, many of Baker's

elevators lost grades on wheat bought in the area and
eventually sold in Minneapolis.

Much of the grain bought

by the Captain's elevators as number one or number two
grade hard spring wheat received a "No Grade" classifi
cation upon its arrival at the terminal markets.

This

downgrading resulted in a loss of six to eight cents per
bushel.

The final poor grade resulted from wheat, oats,

barley, and flax that had been purchased on the tough
47Letter, Baker to Geo. E. Wentworth, Aug. 15,
1900, I. P. Faker Papers, 240, Letter Press Book 41 for
Bismarck Elevator Co., p. 361 1/2.

S3

side.

Sucn grain began to heat when stored in the river

elevators and lost its original high grading.

Added to

this, large shipments of low grade grain also arrived
from other parts of the middle west, bringing the price
of low grade grain down even further.
Crops in 1908 again netted poor yields for
farmers.

Wheat yields were smaller than had been expected.

The oats crop similarly din not come up to expectations,
as stated by the Great Western Elevator Company:

"The

oats crop is poor in quality and light in yield in both
IQ
North Dakota and Minnesota.''
Poor crop prospects, also affected the prospects
for the .lumberyards, established in conjunction with the
elevators primarily by Baker's Expansion Lumber and
Mercantile Company.

Poor prospects for a good, crop in

1910 led Baker to state:

"In view of the fact the crops

will be poor this year, we do not want to sell lumber
except where we are going to get the money, without fail."
The Captain further explr_ned that V e do not want to get
lumber and pay for it and place it in the country and get
nothing for it."

Baker ordered his agent to henceforth

sell lumber only to customers able to pay, since it would
be more advantageous to have lumber laying in the yards4
*
8
48Letter, Great Western Elevator Co. to Baker,
Sept. 14, 1903, I. P. Baker Papers, Box 40, Folder 4.
4^Letter, Douglas to Baker, Sept. 28, 1908, I. P.
Baker Papers, Box 41, Folder 5.

5*1
than to have it in the hands cf farmers with no means of
paying for it,
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Ki**h the close interaction of many of

his businesses, a bad situation for one usually resulted
in a bad situation for the others.
Crop yields in 1914 and 1915 were nearly double
those for each cf the preceding three years.

Profits

grew with an increase in grain and an increase in the
amount of money in the hands of farmers in the area.

In

looking at the relationship between the crop yields and
the profits made by the company in those years, one
notices a definite correlation.

In 1906 the elevator

company claimed a profit of $6,500.11.51

This resulted

from relatively good crops at a time when it began to
build new elevators.

In 1911 the company made only

$6,748.39, though it had more elevators than in 1906. 3
Crops had been poor prior to i912, but that year brought
in even lower yields.

In 1912 the company realized a

profit of only $ 2 ,789.65?^
pitiably small $799.36. ^

The profit for 1913 was a
With the. high yields of 1914*
4
3
5

^Letter, Baker to Stoe1ting, June 27, 1910,
I. P. Baker Papers, Box 42, Folder 4.
^•“Misc. Statements for Bismarck Elevator and
Investment Co. , Cannon Ball Co. and Ferry Companies,
I. P. Baker Papers, 405, Book 30, p. 342.
^ R e e Yard Journal, I. P. Baker Papers, 157,
Book 36, p. 52.
53Ibid., p. 131.
54Journal for Bismarck Elevator and Investment C o . ,
I. P. Baker Papers, 133, Book 12, p. 151.
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and 1915, Baker realized large profits.

The Captain's

company showed $15,667.34 profit for the year of 1914.55
In 1915 the average yield for wheat reached twenty-one
bushels per acre in Burleigh County and eighteen bushels
per acre in Mercer County.56
such a high yield.

Baker never again witnessed

The Bismarck Elevator and Investment

Company reaped a profit of $24,963.83 in 1915.57

Baker

could make handsome profits, even though the railroad
rapidly broke his one-time monopoly in the area.
After the fabulous 1915 harvest, crop yields
resumed their downward spiral, and the newly established
railroad towns attracted many of Baker's old customers.
The company experienced its last outstandingly good year
in 1916 with a profit of $21,673.40, even though crop
CO
yields dropped considerably. ° In the summer of 1915
Robert Rawlins, one oi the Captain's agents, informed his
boss that "the indications are that wheat will not
average more than 4 or 5 bushels per acre.
59
oats will probably be 60% of a crop.*'

Barley and

After 1915*
9
5

Grain Journal #7 for Bismarck Elevator and
Investment Co., I. P. Baker Papers, 151, Book 30, p. 104.
^Lass, Steamboating, p. 165.
Journal for Bismarck Elevator and Investment Co. ,
I. P. Baker Papers, 134, Book 14, p. 222.
5 8Grain Journal #10 for Bismarck Elevator and
Investment Co., I. P. Baker Papers, 153, Book 32, p. 85.
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Letter, Rawlins to Bismarck Elevator and
Investment Co., July 14, 1917, I. P. Baker Papers,
Box 48, Polder 1.

56
yields dropped, as did the price of grain.

By 1917 the

situation had degenerated to such a state that Baker
issued the following directives to his agents:
We do not want to buy any mere grain under the present
conditions, unless it is absolutely necessary to take
it in on account or for material. The way the market
has been going lately it is impossible to protect
ourselves against loss.
Call us up in each case when
it involves taking in some grain, and we will instruct
you what to do.
Baker’s profits continued to decline.

On December 31,

1919, the Captain's books showed only a $3,346.54
profit.61
Throughout his years in the grain buying business,
Baker received financial backing from a number of sources.
With farmers unable to meet their note obligations to him,
Baker could not always meet his own, and often had to have
his notes renewed.

In 1913 Baker could pay off only

$5,000 of a $10,000 note owed to the American State Bank
of Helena, Montana.

T. C. Power, backer of various Baker

business ventures, was the bank's president.

6 2

The Great Western Grain Company of Minneapolis
also provided much capital for the Bismarck Elevator and
Investment Company.

By the end of 1916 it had claims for*
.
I

SO

Letter, Baker to Basford, June 5, 1917, I. P.
Baker Papers, Box 5, Folder 3.
dger for Bismarck Elevator and Investment Co.,
I. P. Baker Papers, 536, ?. 227.
°^Letter, American State Bank to Bismarck Elevator
and Investment Co., Sept. 18, 1913, I. P. Baker Papers,
Box 45, Folder 1.
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g3
$10,000 against the Baker concern.

With continuously

poor crops after 1915, the amount of the outstanding
accounts continued to grow.

By the end of 1919 the books

of the Bismarck Elevator and Investment Company showed a
total of $142,438 in unpaid accounts.

64

The majority of

these arose from grain contracts which farmers had been
unable to repay.

The company could have taken legal

action against farmers in arrears.

In most cases, however,

the farmers held nothing worthwhile i.n the form of
security, and the large number of such cases made the
process virtually impossible.
The fate of another Baker enterprise, the Benton
Transportation Company, directly affected developments
within the Bismarck Elevator and Investment Company.

The

Benton Transportation Company received virtually all its
business from the Bismarck Elevator and Investment
Company.

With a fall in the amount of grain Baker's

elevators bought, the amount of business done by the
packet boats necessarily fell also.

With less grain in

the area, farmers had less money to purchase such things
as lumber and hardware.

As a result, less of these

products were carried by the Benton boats to the elevator
0-^Letter, Great Western Grain Co. to Ernst and
Ernst, Mar. 31, 1917, I. P. Baker Papers, Box 48,
Folder 2.
Statements for Bismarck Elevator and
Investment Co., I. P. Baker Papers, 408, Book 33.
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sites.
By the end of 1916 the Benton Transportation
Company had begun its downward trend toward oblivion,
after .maintaining virtual control of all river traffic
north of Bismarck for nearly three decades.

Poor grain

crops prevailed, and the railroad began hauling away what
little grain that could be grown in the area.

The packet

company showed an indebtedness of $8,400 to the Bank of
Bismarck, another Baker enterprise in 1916.

In

addition, that same year the company owed $20,000 to the
First National Bank in St. P a u l . ^

The company continued

to show losses every year thereafter from 1917 through
1924.

But, "despite the losses, the company continued to

operate."

By 1919 the packet company moved only 1,572

tons of freight.
tons.

Grain shipments totaled only thirty

In 1920 the equivalent of only two or three

packet loads of grain moved on Baker's once highly
profitable line of packet boats. 6S
The Captain, unable to accept the death of his
packet line, enlisted the aid of his lifelong friend and
business colleague, T. C. Power, and the Bismarck
^Letter, Bismarck Bank to Ernst and Ernst,
Dec. 31, 1916, I. P. Baker Papers, Box 48, Folder 2.
^Letter, First National Bank, St. Paul, to Ernst
and Ernst, Dec. 31, 1916, I. P. Baker Papers, Box 48,
Folder 2.
67

lass, Steamboating, pp. 165-166.
Ibid. , p, 164.
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Elevator and Investment Company.

In 1917 Baker and Power

together pumped $22,526.21 into the boat line.
they subsidized the line with $11,703.44.

In 1918

By 1919

Baker secured from the Bismarck Elevator and Investment
Company the sum of $9,706.51.70

In 1921 the Captain's

grain buying business pumped $5,059.20 into the boat
line.

The 1922 subsidy of the grain buying firm

amounted to $6,561.04.
$3,283.44.

In 1923 the subsidy dropped to

The final contribution made by the Bismarck

Elevator and Investment Company to the Benton Packet
Company in 1924 totaled $2,865.49.74

Altogether, Baker's

faltering grain concern pumped over $27,000.00 into the
distressed Benton Packet Company.

Baker and one of his

sons reorganized the boat line a few years later, but for
all practical purposes steamboating on the Upper Missouri
River came to an end in 1924.
With the end of steamboating came the end of the
Bismarck Elevator and Investment Company.

The last

available records show that in 1925 the Ree location
69Ibid., pp. 165-156.
7^Journal for 3enton Packet Co
Papers , 276, Book 6, p. 59.
71Ibid., p. 148.
72 Ibid., p. 194.
7JIbid., P- 247.
74 Ibid., P- 27 2.
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netted a profit of only $182.16.'5
company cease with 1025.

Records of the

By 1924 Isaac P. Baker had

reached the age of sixty-nine.

For over forty years he

had been engaged in business in the Bismarck area, seeing
his Bismarck Elevator and Investment Company pass through
a number of phases.

Rising from the status of a simple

employee in the original firm known as the Bismarck
Elevator Company, Baker had reorganized the company to
control grain buying along the Missouri River north of
Bismarck for the first decade of the twentieth century.
The railroad had dealt the first severe blow to his
prosperous business by providing stiff competition.
Nature robbed him of bountiful crops after 1916, causing
the business, along with his transportation company, to
falter.

When his transportation company was crippled,

the Captain used large amounts of his profits from his
grain buying company in an attempt to save steamboating.
His efforts did not succeed.

Baker's throwing of money

down the steamboating rathole could not save an
antiquated mode of transportation.

With the railroads'

movement into the remoter regions of North Dakota, there
no longer existed a need for Baker's elevators along the
Missouri River.

His elevator doors closed, and along

with them, the activities of the Bismarck Elevator and
Investment Company.
?c
Book

39,

Ree Yard Journal,
p. 264.

I.

P.

Baker Papers,

160,

CHAPTER

IV

THE EXPANSION LUMBER AND .MERCANTILE COMPANY
The Expansion Lumber and Mercantile Company
existed as an independent business enterprise from its
origin in 1906 to its end in 1918.

Isaac P. Baker,

together with Benjamin Stoeiting and M. J. Walden,
incorporated the original company.

Baker attained sole

ownership of the firm in 1913 and struggled with it for
five more years until it was merged with another of his
enterprises, the catchall Bismarck Elevator and
Investment Company.
The Expansion Lumber and Mercantile Company came
into being on July 5, 1906, when it was incorporated for
a period of twenty years.'5'

Bismarck served as the home

office for the company with the following North Dakota
men serving as owners and directors:

Isaac P. Baker,

Bismarck, Benjamin Stoeiting, Expansion, and M. J. Walden,
Bismarck.^

The business of the company involved "the

buying and selling of lumber and all other kinds of
Letter from Ben Meier, North Dakota Secretary of
State, Bismarck, Sept. 14, 1971.
7

Articles of Incorporation and Board of Directors’
Meetings for Expansion Lumber and Mercantile Co., I. P.
Baker Papers, 170, Book 1, pp. 1-2,

61

62

building material and of buying, selling and dealing in
all kinds of Merchandize jjaicl."

Provision was also made

for the owning and operating of grain elevators and
warehouses *~
On June 30, 1906, stockholders of the Expansion
Lumber and Mercantile Company met for the first time in
Bismarck,

Capital consisted of 160 shares of stock, with

a par value of $100 each.

Captain Baker maintained

controlling interest with 119 shares, Benjamin Stoeiting
held 40 shares, and M. J. Walden claimed the remaining
share.4

Baker assumed the presidency of the newly

formed corporation with Stoeiting serving as vice
president and manager, and Walden, with his one share,
becoming secretary.5
The company prospered during its first two years
of existence because of the heavy grain harvest in the
fail of 1906.

A stockholders meeting on February 11,

1908, learned that the company made a profit of $7,177.84
the previous year.

Walden, Stoeiting, and Baker appeared

at this meeting, representing their original shares.6

By

the 1910 Board of Directors' meeting, M. J. Walden’s name
■*Zbid., p.
4

1.

Ibic.

5 I b i d . , P-

7.

6I b i d . , P.

23.

32
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had been dropped from the Itat of stockholders and
officers.7
The meeting of the stockholders of the company,
eld on June 36, 1913* was attended by Isaac P. Baker.,
x^presenting Al9 shares of stock? and Isaac's son, Benton,
r> presenting one share of stock.8

It is quite possible

tbit Benton acquired his one share from. M. J. Walden.

The

ye r 1913 proved very significant in the life of the
company.

It. marked the year Benjamin Stoelting bought

the Expansion, North Dakota, yard--the yard from which
the company acquired its name.

Until 1913 the Expansion

ya.r« and the Bee, North. Dakota, yard had served, as the
con»|any'u two principal locations.

Prow, that point on,

the Expansion Lumber and Mercantile Company became a
family owned enterprise, with the Captain at the helm and
two of his young sons, Frayne and Benton, playing the role
of interested observers,
No extensive minutes were recorded after the 1913
mee4ing, when the original corporation transformed into a
fan* ly enterprise.

The final recorded, meeting occurred

on February 12, 1918.

Shortly thereafter, the Easiness

act ivities of the company were incorporated into another
Ba;er enterprise, the Bismarck Elevator and. Investment
Ctapany.
7Ibid., p. 27.
8Ibid., p. 29.

The company's first major purchases occurred at
the first meeting held on June 30, 1906.

The stock of

lumber of the Bismarck Elevator and Investment Company
came to the new company for $11,860.26.

Also purchased

from this same firm— owned by I. P. Baker— were its
warehouse and lumber shed at Expansion, in Mercer County,
for $983.07; and their safe, table, and letter-press, for
$60.24.

The company also purchased a team of horses for

$252.00 for the Expansion yard.^

It was an unimpressive

beginning; but the company soon built other warehouses
and grain elevators at points along the Missouri River,
north and west of Bismarck,

These, over the next twelve

years, included Deapclis, Stanton, Ree, South Berthold,
and Golden Valley, all in Mercer County; Crow's Heart, in
McLean County; and Sanger, in Oliver County.

The

majority of the operations proved small and short-lived.
Only Ree and Crow’s Heart experienced anything
approaching longevity.
In 1908 the company purchased half of the stock
of the Deapolis Lumber and Elevator Company at Deapolis,
io
North Dakota.'*’
This endeavor proved unprofitable.
In
late 1909 the Deapolis Company reached the auction clock.
Laker attempted to sell this newly purchased branch to
the Hawkeye Elevator Company of Minneapolis, but received
^Xbid., pp. 7-8.
10Ibid., p. 25.
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the following reply;
We find that we have considerable grief in
connection with the yards we already have in No. Oak.
and do not care to take on any more at present.
After the whether i s m
has settled ne*t spring we
might be in position to talk business.*
1^
Business for other lumber and mercantile companies, it
appears, also lagged in North Dakota as 1910 approached.
The Deapolis yard eventually was sold by the company in
1910.

Available records failed to identify its new owner,

but a letter from G. G. Radke, grain buyer at Expansion,
to Baker on August 24, 1910, confirms the sale.

12

During 1910 the company expanded its interests to
include operation of lumber and machinery yards at Ree
and Sanger.

13

In August 1910, the company purchased a

site for construction of the Ree elevator.2,4

The original

name of Ree was Stoeltington, named for Benjamin
Stoelting.

however, after the erection of the elevator

for the company, the post office name became Ree, short
for Arikara, since the site once had been an Arikara
Indian village.

15

The Ree and Expansion elevators and

^Letter, Hawkeye Elevator Co. to Baker, Dec. 10,
1909, I. P. Baker Papers, Box 87, Folder 4.
*~Letter, G. G. Radke to Baker, August 24, 1910r
I. P. Baker Papers, Box 92, Folder 4.
11
.Articles of Incorporation and Board of Directors*
Meetings, I. P. Baker Papers, 170 Book 1, pp. 26-27.
~ Ibid. , p. 28.
~"Mary Ann Barnes Williams, Origins of North Dakota
Name Places (Bismarck: Bismarck Tribune, 1966), p. 102. "

lumber warehouses remained the principal source of
business for the Expansion Lumber and Mercantile Company
through 1913.

Before the establishment of the lumber

warehouse and elevator at Ree in 1910, the elevator and
lumber warehouse at Expansion had been the primary
business establishment of the company.

The Deapolis

venture had failed; the Ree establishment experienced a
longer span of life.
Benjamin Stoelting, who originally owned forty
shares of stock in the company, became manager at the
Expansion office in 1906.

Baker, as president, resided

in Bismarck, the location of the main office of the firm.
Their relationship over seven years, from 1906 to 1913,
deteriorated from pleas on Stoelting's part for shipments
of merchandise from Bismarck to be made more quickly to
Expansion, to outright accusations of cheating one
d
another. Their relationship eventually ended on
January 29, 1913, when the Expansion branch of the
company was purchased by Stoelting for $5,635.14; the
open book accounts for the Expansion yard for $3,110.72;
and the lumber shed, warehouse and various other sundry
items at Expansion for $1,545.26.16

The Ree elevator and

warehouse were all that remained of the Expansion Lumber
and Mercantile Company after the sale to Benjamin
Stoelting.
•^Articles of Incorporation and Board of Directors'
Meetings, I. P. Baker Papers, 170, Book 1, pp. 26-27.
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After selling the Expansion branch in early 1913,
Baker established an elevator and lumberyard at Crow’s
Heart, in McLean County.171
8 Though the Expansion yard had
been sold, the company still continued under its original
name.

After his break with his original firm and out

right purchase of part of it, Stoelting in May 1915
designated his own company, the Expansion Mercantile
Company.

In April 1917 he again changed the name of his
VO
company, this time to the Hazen Mercantile Company.
During the first seven years of Expansion's
existence, when Stoelting was still a part of the firm,
many words of advice flowed from Stoelting to the Captain.
Situated at the office in Expansion, Stoelting appeared to
have a better point from which to see the needs of the
company than Baker located in Bismarck.
The grain trade occupied the majority of the
company's time during peak periods.

Nevertheless, during

slack periods other mercantile activities had to be
pursued to justify the company's keeping its doors open
year around.

Stoelting realized this fact and encouraged

other economic endeavors, but he became discouraged when
Baker apparently shunned them or placed them in secondary
positions.
Stoelting had been approached in 1908 by a
17Ibid., p. 29.
18

Letter from Ben Meier, North Dakota Secretary of
State, Bismarck, Sept. 28, 1971.
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representative of the J. I. Case Company to establish a
machinery franchise in the newly established Deapolis
branch.

He told Baker:

"I think it would be a good

thing to get that agency, if we sell a machine, there is
]Q
good money for us, if we do not, we are out nothing.”
Nothing came of the proposition, and much less became of
the Deapolis branch.

Stoelting warned Baker of the

necessity of hiring a competent man at the Deapolis site
shortly after its acquisition:
Excuse me for again calling your attention to the
fact that we ought to have a competent man in the
yard at Deapolis. Now the foundation is laid for
practically the whole season's business and the
sooner we get a man there the better. There is
going to be lots of building going on near Deapolis
ana there is no reason, it seems to me, why the
Deapolis yard should not pay big this summer . . . .
I could spend some time down there myself, but we
have most money invested here and have to take care
of Expansion. ^
Deapolis did not have the potential, possibly because of
Stoelting's unheeded advice.

Shortly thereafter, Deapolis

was sold.
The Captain was noted for his frugality; often it
backfired on him.

Stoelting became increasingly

discouraged with the quality of lumber he received from
Baker.

He pointedly informed Baker:

"We have lost more

than a thousand dollars at this place [ExpansionJ this1
1Q
Letter, Stoelting to Baker, May 2, 1908, I. P.
Baker Papers, Box 92, Folder 2.
20 Ibid., Mar. 10, 1908.
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spring because we had no good shiplap and I want good
shiplap in [thej future.*'21

S toe 1 ting later pleaded with

Baker to stop ordering such low grade lumber because
farmers in the area would not purchase such inferior
material.

In 1907 Baker had ordered some number four and

number five grade boards for Expansion, and only
about ten per cent of them had been sold by 1909.22*
4
2
Baker oftentimes failed to ship certain seasonal
machinery to Expansion in time for it to be used that
season.

Stoelting noted that the South Berthold yard had

many orders for binders, but the farmers could not wait
for them to arrive and patronized more reliable firms.
Stoelting added:

"Next year we want to be sure and get

the binders in early, in Hay or June."

Baker proved

negligent in his supply of machinery to his various
establishments, and he also failed to keep his lumber
warehouses adequately supplied.

Stoelting informed Baker

of conditions at the South Berthold yard in the summer of
1909:

"They have to have lumber up the [[re] if they are

to do any business.

They have not had any shiplap all
24
summer[,] besides they have not a single board now.”
The Captain's late delivery of merchandise
2"Ibid., June 30, 1909.
^2Ibid., July 24, 1904.
2JIbid., Aug. 9, 1909.
24 I b i d . , Aug .

25,

1909
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handicapped his business.

Possibly he had become engaged

in z oo many diverse activities to allow him to efficiently
handle the supplying of the company with the merchandise
its customers desired.

On numerous occasions, Stoelting

warned Baker of the necessity of early delivery and of
maintaining a sufficient supply of high grade lumber at
their various warehouses.

Baker, however, may have still

viewed the grain trade as the only important endeavor with
which the company was engaged.

By viewing it in this

manner, he only succeeded in weakening his entire company.
Numerous other instances of Baker's late shipments
of goods and products were elaborated on by Baker's
manager.

"We had a traction engine and breaking outfit

sold to E. Poison, if we could have delivered some in
time for spring breaking."25

The company also engaged in

selling fence wire to the farmers, and early summer
served as the prime market time for this product.
Stoelting realized this, but again Baker proved delin
quent in his supplying of the material.

Stoelting warned

the Captain that the farmers "will sooner drive 40 miles
to get it than wait."
Stoelting's authority remained limited while he
occupied the position of manager at the Expansion*
6
2
“ Letter, Stoelting to Baker, Apr. 4, 1910, I. P.
Baker Papers, Box 92, Folder 4.
26Ibid., May 26, 1910.
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location.

All material purchased by the yard had to have

the Captain's approval.
activity of the yard.

Frequently this hindered the
In one instance, Stoeltinq

urgently needed a team of horses for the yard and pleaded
with Baker that "unless you give me authority to buy a
team for this yard the lumber will have to stay at the
landing."^

Thus, Stoelting could not purchase

necessities for the yard without the Captain's appr val.
Credit customers continued to play havoc with the
firm.

Baker's policy had been to have his manager make

collection trips periodically throughout the area to
collect outstanding accounts.

Stoelting realized the

futility of such a procedure because of the large number
of people owing the company, the time involved, and the
distance which would have to be traveled to make the
collections.

He believed they had "to have a fixed place

in Stanton so the people, that owe us at Stanton and
Deapolis know where to go whenever they can pay."

2 8

Baker

rejected this suggestion because he believed it would
become too expensive, and his old and quite unsuccessful
method of hit-and-miss collecting continued.
Baker became discouraged with the Expansion
Lumber and Mercantile Company in late 1910.

Profits had

not been what he had expected, and the grain trade, on2
7
27Ibid., May 27, 1910.
28Ibid., June 2, 1910.
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which he counted for a large part of the success of the
company, faltered.

He contemplated selling the entire

stock of the company to Benjamin Stoe1ting.
however, the deal fell through.

At this date,

According to Stoelting:

It is not practicable to take you up on your
offer to sell the whole to me, but I ’ll make you the
following proposition: w e ’ll dissolve the
corporation and I ’ll buy the Expansion yard and you
take the Ree yard {by far the better place of the
two).
If agreeable to you I'll come to Bismarck and
we'll arrange details. 9
A clash developed between Baker and Stoelting
which proved detrimental to their relationship.

Baker

accused Stoelting of receiving money from a certain
account, pocketing it, and not crediting it to the books
of the Expansion Lumber and Mercantile Company.
informed his manager:

Baker

"The only course left to us is to

charge this account to you and give you credit for your
June 1911 salary and yard expenses."

30

Stoelting

adamantly disclaimed dishonesty on his part:
I have not received the money from the Schramm
School Distr. as you insinuate . . . .
I have never
yet made a single cent in my pocket in any contract.
Furthermore if I had used the money without remitting
to you it would have been dishonest, and if you
believe I am dishonest send, somebody to take my
place.31
The repercussions of the controversy proved extremely*
1
3
“^Letter, Stoelting to Baker, Nov. 30, 1910, I. P.
Baker Papers, Box 92, Folder 4.
■>n
Letter, Baker to Stoelting, July 7, 1911, I. P.
Baker Papers, Box 92, Folder 4.
31

L e t t e r , S t o e l t i n g to Ba k e r ,
B a k e r P a p e r s , B o x 92, F o l d e r 4.

July

10,

1911,

I.

P.
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detrimental to the Stoelting-Baker relationship.
Steelting remained as manager of the Expansion branch
until he bought out that branch in 1913.

This did not

prove to be a surprising move, since prior discussions of
this matter had taken place as early as 1910.
Stoelting's departure from the Expansion Lumber
and Mercantile Company gave Baker sole ownership.

Hence

forth, he alone controlled the policies of the firm.

The

Captain found the days ahead filled with changes,
exemplified by the coming of the railroad, poor crops,
unwise decisions, and defeat.
The Captain encountered problems even after many
of his goods had reached the customers.

Purchasers

repeatedly charged their goods with the intent to pay
when their crops were harvested.

Frequently the charge

customers faced poor harvests or other calamities, which
would hinder their payment to Baker’s company.

The

Captain advised William Haliricker, his Stanton manager,
not to sell additional lumber without a cash payment or
security.

Haliricker promptly retorted:

"How if that is

the way we have to sell lumber, we will not do any
business, for other companys ^sicTj will sell the
lumber."32

Although cash or good security would have

solved the bad accounts situation, it would also have
meant a grave decline in business.

Baker felt the decline

■^Letter, William Haliricker to Baker, June 16,
1908,

I.

P,

Baker Papers,

Box

92,

Folder

2,
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in business was not worth the risk.
Baker often contracted grain from the farmers.
He realized profit on this endeavor by charging eight per
cent interest on the money payment he made to the farmers.
One of Baker's grain contractors# Fred Krause# Jr.,
testified to the failure of this method:
The outlook for contracting grain is not very
good.
It seems that those that need any money have
no grain for sale. And those that have grain# would
sell it and take 500 a bushel, but are not in need of
money bad enough to pay 8% interest on the money.33
The farmers resented the high rate of interest they were
forced to pay.

A. W. Stoll# Baker's manager at Ree#

warned that other firms charged less interest# and "if
we want any business we will have to do the same."
Farmers also rebelled against the measurement their grain
received.

Many believed that they received less than

their rightful share, which prompted A. W. Stoll to urge
Baker to "please send up a £nj inspector to look after the
scales as the farmers are not satisfied."

35

After the sale of the Expansion yard in 1913, the
Ree location became the focal point of business for the
company.

The success of the company now depended upon

the success of the Ree site; primarily its elevator.
^Letter, Krause to Baker# Dec. 7, 1910, I. P.
Baker Papers, Box 92, Folder 4.
" 'Letter, Stoll to Baker# June 9, 1911, I. P.
Baker Papers, Box 92, Folder 3.
5Ibid. , Sept. 5, 1912.
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Conditions at the Ree elevator# however, proved far from
satisfactory in 1913.

Fred Krause, Jr.f reported:

"In

looking over our Ree Elevator I find that we have to do a
lot of repairing on it before we can handle any of the
new crop."

Conditions deteriorated and the fall harvest

rapidly approached.

Krause further informed the Captain

that "Ree has been a very unsatisfactory grain market,
just on account of things not being in shape to handle
the grain."**
In the fall of 1913, Baker and his company faced
many serious problems.

A substantial number of farmers

had begun to transport their grain to neighboring towns,
rather than accept Baker's lower prices.

Baker urged his

grain buyers "to use wholesome tact and treat them
nice.*37

He realized the importance of the farmers’

business, but he still continued paying lower prices than
the nearby dealers.

Baker also feared the railroad.

He

warned A. W. Stoll, his Crow's Heart agent, that "the
R.R.

{New Line) will try to take the business this winter

Watch them."3®: Radke, Baker's agent at Ree, warned:

"We

are daily receiving complaints from people around here
that the difference in prices on wheat between here and
--"Letter, Krause to Baker, Aug. 8, 1913, I. P.
Baker Papers, Box 92, Folder 5.
-7Letter, Baker to Stoll, Oct. 8, 1913, I. P.
Baker Papers, Box 92, Folder 5.
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Railroad points South of here is always from 2 to 3 cts."
The railroad had reached points nearer to the Captain’s
Missouri River elevators and Radke informed Baker that
"roost of our customers have just as near to railroad
points as here.*3*

Baker's position as sole grain buyer

in the area rapidly vanished as new competition arrived
in the area.

His prices would have to be raised, or his

business would come to a standstill,

although apparently

aware of the competition and his power to do something
about it, Baker took no positive steps to alleviate the
situation.
The Captain became angered upon learning that
A. W. Stoll had informed one of the parties that owed the
company that he could not haul in his grain to pay for
the debt because the elevator had been filled, and no
boat arrivals were in. prospect.

Baker promptly advised

Stoll to “kindly write him at once and tell him to
commence hauling any time; that you have room for all
grain delivered by parties who are owing us.

40

Procedural failures like these contributed to the growing
decline of the Captain's business.
The years 1914 and 1915 proved adverse to the
grain trade of the company.

Late harvest prevented

3*Letter, Radke to Baker, Oct. 3, 1915, I. P.
Baker Papers, Box 93, Folder 1.
^Letter, Baker iu toll, Nov. 6, 1913, I. P.
Baker Papers, Box 92, Folder 5.

11
marketing of much grain before the close of navigation."41
Coupled with Baker's perpetual tendency to pay low
prices for grain, the outlook appeared bleak.

Fred

Krause, Jr,, reported to Baker:
Lately we have been paying from 1 to 2C less for
grain then the buyers at Golden valley— Sap— and
Beulah, farmers are kicking awful, we have been
telling them, that we arc* going to pay more for grain
here right along then they are getting at the
Railroad, and now we are even below them.’2
Baker appeared aware of the situation.

Be told.

Jacob Teskv, the Crow's Heart agent for part of 1914:
"Remember we make our money off their trade, and you must
treat them fair and retain their friendship."

43

But

Baker failed to realize that the farmers wanted more than
friendship.

They desired a reasonable price for their

grain, and they marketed it accordingly.
Baker made certain concessions early in 1916 when
he agreed to pay one cent less than nearby railroad town
grain buying firms.

There appeared discrepancies,

however, in what Baker agreed to pay and whar he actually
paid for the grain.

One of Baker’s grain buyers reminded

the Captain that although he had promised to pay the
farmers one cent under railroad town prices, he was
actually paying three to four cents under their
“^Lass, Steamboating, p. 163.
^Letter, Krause to Baker, Oct. 1, 1914, I. P.
Baker Papers, Box. 92, Folder 6.
4-^Letter, Baker to Jacob J. Tesky, Nov. 14, 1914,
I. P. Baker Papers, Box 92, Folder 6.
i
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prices,4 4
Railroad towns offered competition to the Captain
and his company in other ways.

Railroads could transport

machinery and other merchandise into newly established
railroad towns and compete with the company's other line,
aeneral merchandise.

Radke realized this and urged Baker

to hire another man at Ree to enable him to sell
machinery throughout the region.
to Baker:

As Radke pointed out

"We can not expect people which live a ways

from here to come in here and ask us to sell to them when
they can just as well buy it at their Railroad towns."
Many of the failures of the Captain's businesses
could directly be attributed to Baker's unwise leadership.
He seldom took the advice of his various managers.

Often

the material he ordered arrived, only to be of inferior
quality, and could not be sold at cost.

Baker's practice

of underpaying the farmers for their grain proved
extremely unpopular to the farmers on whom he depended
for business.

His equipment, notably the Ree elevator,

rapidly fell into disrepair.

These instances all served

as failures partly, or wholely, attributeable to Baker.
There developed other misfortunes which seemed to be
unavoidable for Baker.

These, together with Baker's own*
5
4

44
'Letter, Radke to Laker, Jan. 20, 1916, I. P.
Baker Papers, Box 93, Folder 1.
45Ihid., Mar. 13, 1916.
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mistakes rapidly drove the Expansion Lumber and
Mercantile Company into a floundering concern.
Open, unpaid accounts continued to play havoc
with Baker, particularly after 1912.

The open book

accounts at Ree in 1912 amounted to $1,988.87.

Many of

tne accounts belonged to men who obviously had no visible
means of liquidating the amount.

Baker registered irri

tation with his Ree manager, A. W. Stoll, for extending
credit to them by proclaiming:

"We feel that you

certainly would not have sold these parties if all they
possessed was encumbered, and they had no visible means
of paying for the goods."

The company experienced

problems paying its own bills.

In 1914 the Minnesota

Moline Plow Company, from which Baker purchased much of
his machinery, twice informed them of their overdue
account of $2,326.78.^
The summer and early fall of 1913 proved
particularly difficult for Baker and his company.

The

Captain's correspondence to his managers at Ree and
Crow's Heart contained earnest pleas for them to collect
outstanding accounts.

The Captain further urged his

grain buyers not to pay cash for grain received from
parties who owed the company money.

Often admonitions

Letter, Baker to Stoll, Mar. 15, 1912, I. P.
Baker Papers, Box 92, Folder 3.
&7
* Letter, Minnesota Moline Plow Co. to Expansion
Lumber and Mercantile Co., Dec. 4, 1914, I. P. Baker
Papers, Box 92, Folder 6.
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such as the following, passed unheeded:
We have gone through the cancelled checks which have
come into the bank during the month of May, and we
find the following parties have been paid in cash for
their grain, all of whom are either owing us old past
due notes or open book accounts. °
The Crow’s Heart agent had been paying cash for grain to
people owing the '"'•npanv.

Lent- -f-han two end one-half

months later the Captain cautioned his agent at Crow's
Heart not to "be paying parties cash for their grain who
are owing us old past due notes or open book accounts.”
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Baker urged his managers to go through the
countryside and collect from people who owed the company.
Ordering the task was simple, but successfully executing
it became very difficult.

The Captain, above everyone

else, should have been aware of the financial condition
of the people in the area at the time.

Baker’s condition

was soon similar to that of many of the farmers in the
area.

Crops were very small, and farmers found mere

survival difficult enough without attempting to pay past,
overdue accounts.

The economic situation of the time

worked directly against Baker.
Late in 1913 Baker's managers at Ree and Crow’s
Heart began paying cash for grain to only those customers
who did not owe the company— something Baker had been
^Letter, Baker to Radke,
Baker Papers, Box 92, Polder 5.

m e 19, 1913, I. P.

4 - L e t t e r , Baker to Stoll, Sept.
B a k e r P a p e r s , B o x 92, F o l d e r 6.

26,

1913,

I.

P.
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striving for consistently for over six months.

As

expected, farmers who owed Baker began taking their grain
to other elevators.

Farmers needed cash to buy food and

clothing and not credits on their past due accounts.
According to A. W. Stoll, "most of the grain is coming
from parti'-'*- *w
up."

i.
. .i owe and those that have paid

Baker realized the necessity of getting in the

collections in the fall when the grain came in, because
that was the only time when the farmers had any cash on
hand.

The Captain informed Stoll that "if you don't get

your collections in now, you won't get them for a year and
we must have them n o w . B a k e r

could have taken legal

action against his delinquent customers.

However, it

would have possibly cost more than it would have gained,
and the farmers really had nothing worthwhile to take as
collateral on their unpaid accounts.
During 1913 the profits from the Crow’s Heart
branch of the company amounted to only $600, which
included both the lumberyard and elevator.
had $550 in uncollectable accounts.

This site also

Baker informed Stoll

that "our entire profits at Crow's Heart are wiped out by
reason of bad accounts."

He went on to advise Stoll to

get the consent of hxs customers to file a lien on their
^Letter, Stoll to Baker, Nov. .1.1, 1913, I. P.
Baker Papers, Box 92, Folder 5.
^“Letter, Baker to Stoll, Nov. 6, 1913, I. P.
Baker Papers, Box 92, Folder 5.

crops for any bill of goods in excess of twenty-five
dollars.

Baker concluded by explaining that "had you done

this in these cases we would have had some security and
protection."J
The Captain's manager at Crow's Heart in the
summer of .1914, G. G. Radke, became discouraged with his
Crow's Heart position.

Radke informed the Contain;

'jotting tired of this place here."

He then applied

for a position at Baker's newly established branch at
CO
Golden Valley.
Radke received the new position, but
Baker's new establishment floundered, much as had his
earlier Deapolis endeavor.

The business lasted only one

season, and much of the merchandise inventory Baker sold
to the Golden Valley Implement Company.
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The poor crop

had rendered the farmers' purchasing power almost non
existent.

The Captain's desperate attempts to save his

floundering company by expanding it only contributed to
its demise.

At a time when Baker should have consol

idated his company to make it more stable, he attempted
to widen its scope, making it more vulnerable.
Jacob J. Tesky replaced Radke as agent at Crow's
Heart in July 1914.

Radke departed for his ill-fated

32Ibid., Dec. 9, 1913.
~*2Letter, Radke to Baker, June 30, 1914, I. P.
Baker Papers, Box 92, Folder 6.
■^Letter, Radke to Baker, Mar. 27, 1915, I. P.
Baker Papers, Box 93, Folder 1.
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Golden Valley venture.

By December business had declined

to such an extent that it no longer remained economically
feasible to remain open at Crow's H e a r t . T h e

Crow's

Heart station had been set up in 1913 after the sale of
the Expansion branch to Benjamin Stoelting, and only one
year after its beginning it could not produce enough
business to warrant its being open during the winter
months.

The poor grain trade necessarily played a major

role in forcing the close of the elevator.

Grain not

only provided Baker’s elevators with business- but also
provided the farmers of the area with money to purchase
other goods, especially general merchandise goods, sold
by the captain in conjunction with his elevators.

The

lack of grain closed Baker's other avenue of business, his
general merchandise sales.
The years 1916 and 1917 proved even more dismal
for the company.

The Captain faced uncollectable

accounts, poor crops, and a lack of business.

The open

book accounts at Ree in April 1914 totaled over $1,500,
and the uncoilectable accounts mounted each year.
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The

grain buying business proved less and less profitable.
In June 1917 Baker advised his Ree agent not to buy grain
from farmers "unless it is absolutely necessary to take
"^Letter, Baker to Tesky, Dec. 9, 1914, I. P,
Baker Papers, Box 92, Folder 6.
^Letter, Radke to Baker, Apr. 18, 1917, I. P.
Baker Papers, Box 93, Folder 2.
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it in on account, for material."

Baker further informed

his Ree agent that "the way the market has been going
lately it is impossible to protect ourselves against
loss.”

The original purpose for which the company had

been formed, the grain and mercantile trade, now appeared
unprofitable to Captain 3aker even when he could purchase
the grain.

The company faced a terrible dilemma, and the

situation appeared to be getting worse.
Baker's Ree agent in the fall of 1917, W. 0.
Basford, proved well informed about the business
situation there.

Baker hinted to Basford that his

business at Ree had been anything but spectacular over
the past few months.

Basford explained rather vividly the

circumstances at Ree:
You intimated in one of your letters that i was
not getting a very good class of trade, will admit
that as the good class of trade has wheat to sell,
and there has been no market here, the next class
owing to the two poor crops have no money, and the
only money that has been in circulation here is the
Indian government money.
If you would please to give
a fellow some idea as to whether you wanted to just
make a bluff at business until things are settled i
could govern my self according. °
The Captain realized that a "bluff at business," as
Basford had called if, would only cause further losses.
The Ree elevator closed its doors in the fall of 1917 as
the Crow's Heart elevator had done in the late fall of
^Letter, Baker to Basford, June 5, 1917, I. P.
Baker Papers. Box 5, Folder 3.
"Letter, Basford to Baker, Sept. 5, 1917, I. P.
Baker Papers, Bor. 93, Folder 2.
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1914.
During the spring of 1918 the company existed
large!/ in name only.

The elevators had been closed in

1917, however, the general merchandise business continued
to limp along.

The Captain understood the futility of

such a situation, and in July 1918 informed Hasford to
address? future correspondence to him either at the
Expansion Lumber and Mercantile Company or at the Bismarck
Elevator and Investment Company.59
The Expansion Lumber and Mercantile Company in
1918 returned to the place from which its original
property had been purchased, the Bismarck Elevator and
Investment Company.

It no longer acted as an independent

establishment, having been absorbed by a larger Baker
concern.
Mature dealt the final blow to the company's
elevator less than two months after its business had been
taken over by the Bismarck Elevator and Investment
Company.

A cyclone damaged the elevator considerably,

moving the warehouse attached to the elevator from its
foundation and completely destroying the coal house.
Attempts to repair the elevator for the opening of the
1918 grain season were completely unrealistic.

The

"^Letter, Baker to Basford, July 2, 1918, I. P.
Baker Papers, Box 48, Folder 3.
^Letter, Basford to Baker, Aug. 21, 1518, I. P.
Baker Papers, Box 93, Folder 2.
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attempts by Baker to make a profitable business out of
the grain trade on the Missouri River had failed.
The failure of the company proved an undeni at'le
fact.

The company committed both avoidable and

unavoidable mistakes.

One of the major problems which

confronted Baker v/as the entry of the railroad into the
territory.
Captain Baker . . . may not have known it at the
time, but when the Northern Pacific railroad laid its
tracks across the Missouri River at Bismarck in the
winter of 1879-1880 . . . it marked the beginning of
the end for steamboating on the Big Muddy.®1
The railroad hauled grain much more quickly and conven
iently than could Baker's packet boats; yet it did not
cause much interference with Baker's grain business until
after 1910.

Nevertheless, by 1918 the Captain's grain

elevators had closed their doors.
Nature, likewise, raised havoc with the Captain
and his company.

"Drought caused wheat production in

the Bismarck area to fall off sharply in 1916 and 1917."
With its primary source of business at a near standstill,
Baker's elevators closed.

Remaining open would only have

resulted in more losses for Baker.

With little money in

circulation among the farmers, because of the small grain
crops, Baker's mercantile branches similarly suffered.
The Expansion Lumber and Mercantile Company,
^-Bismarck Tribune, Jan. 28, 1938, p. 1.
62

Lass, Steamboating, p. 164.
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incorporate’ at a tine of relative prosperity, faced an
unusual numb >r of obstacles in its brief existence.

It

became a victim of mismanagement, poor judgment, bad
economic cond tions, the railroad, and nature.
of all, it was an anachronism.

But, most

The grain trade, based on

river transpor ation, revealed itself to be economically
unfeasible at the close of the second decade of the
century.

"Oder \ means of transportation rapidly replaced

the antiqueted

aeke*, system for moving farmers' grain to

major shipping )oints.

A way of life had passed out of

existence, and v ith it, the Expansion Lumber and
Mercantile Comps ny.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION
Isaac Post Baker's influence in North Dakota can
be traced back at. far as the state's own beginning in
1889*

A non-native North Dakotan by birth, the Captain

influenced many of the business activities in western
North Dakota after arriving in Bismarck from St. Louis,
Missouri, in 1881.

After initially establishing himself

in steani»oatingr the Captain’s initiative steered him
into many new avenue 3 of financial and civic endeavor.
Baker served as Democratic mayor of Bismarck 1890-1891,
as a North Dakota delegate to the Democratic National
Convention in 1900, and as World War I Federal fuel
Administrator for North Dakota.*

Throughout his lifetime,

Baker maintained an avid interest in national and state
politics.

For over forty years steamboating and Captain

I. P. Baker were synonymous for North Dakotans.

During

his lifetime the Captain developed a number of other
business enterprises in North Dakota.

The Bismarck

Realty Company, the Bismarck Elevator and Investment
Company, and the Expansion Lumber and Mercantile Cc: ^any
were a few of the other business involvements of the
Bismarck Tribune, Jan. 28, 1938, p. 2.
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Captain.
Though the three companies existed separately as
business organizations,
between them.

there was much interdependence

It was this close interdependence which

eventually led to the destruction of all three.

The

grain trade provided the basis for the activities of all
three companies.

The Bismarck Realty Company depended

upon high grain yields to collect profits from its rented
land.

It could also sell more land if customers were

sure that the region was adaptable to profitable
agriculture.

The Bismarck Elevator and investment

Company depended, upon the grain trade solely for its
livelihood.

The more grain bought by the company, the

larger its profits.

The Expansion Lumber and Mercantile

Company also depended upon the grain trade.

The number

of charge customers it had depended upon the conditions
of the crops in the area.
and fewer charge accounts.
results.

Good crops meant heavy trade
Poor crops produced opposite-

With all three companies so dependent upon the

grain trade, it is not surprising that all three companies
folded when the grain trade faltered after 1915,
Baker's companies all realized profits from their
early years to 1912.

By 1915 Baker was confronted with

two very serious obstacles.

First, a crop failure had

greatly reduced the yields of the crops along the
Missouri River.
disappeared.

The farmers* purchasing power had almost

These crop failures continued for over two
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decades.

Second, the railroad had penetrated into areas

of North Dakota where Baker's elevators had enjoyed a
monopoly in grain buying.

The railroad brought other

grain buyers into the territory who established grain
buying elevators in the new railroad towns.

These

elevators offered the farmers of the area much better
prices than Baker had been paying.

Baker’s stubborn

refusal to raise his prices to match the competitive
railroad town prices caused his customers to desert his
elevators for the new ones.
Baker's wealth was not entirely tied up in the
three companies studied here.

However, as his river

transportation company began to falter, he did pour much
of his resources into his transportation company with the
hope that by saving it he could still preserve the grain
trade along the Missouri.

He had no way of knowing that

crop conditions in and around Bismarck, would not improve
for nearly two decades.

By that time "motor trucks and

improved roads would replace the gasoline packets and the
river route."

By the 1920's the Captain had been

involved in river transportation for nearly forty years.
Possibly he "found it difficult to realize that it had
become an antiquated business and should be abandoned.”^
There was always the temptation to think of the good old
days and believe that they would return.
“*Lass, Steamboating, p. 166.

This may have
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been a major reason for Baker's lack of foresight and his
efforts to preserve an out-of-date organization.
Isaac Post Baker ruled all three companies with
an iron hand.

His agents were allowed to make relatively

few decisions on their own.

Baker lacked good business

sense in this situation because he refused to take advice
from others.

Many times hi* agents were in a better

position to view policy alternatives than was Baker.
Still, their advice went unheeded.

Baker's late shipment

of seasonal goods and machinery to his lumberyards meant
lost sales for him.

The Captain often ordered cheap,

low-grade lumber for his firms which remained unsold.
His continuous refusal to pay competitive prices for
grain, once new grain buyers entered the area, lost for
him even more business.

His refusal to comply with

farmers' simple, reasonable requests for grain storage
tickets further alienated his customers.
Poor crops, the entry of the railroad into the
territory, and Baker's own persistent poor judgment
contributed to the failure of all three companies.

The

Captain had realized profits from all three companies in
their beginning, simply because people in the area had
nowhere else to sell their grain.

His monopoly on the

grain trade allowed him initial profits.

As competition

entered the scene and new innovations were needed within
his organizations, the Captain could not successfully
meet and overcome the obstacles.

With the implementation
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of Baker's own practices, his companies were destined to
failure.

Had Baker been willing to conform to the

changing times, his businesses may have prospered for a
few more years.

However, the Baker method of attempting

to overcome all obstacles encountered without compromise
was doomed from the start.
Baker possessed a number of characteristics
similar to those of some of the more noted "Robber
Barons" of the "Gilded Age.”

He appeared interested in

making financial advance at almost any cost and did not
care for the feelings of those who stood in his way.

He

did not hesitate to fire his agents without notice, and
cared only that they served his cause well.

One of

Baker’s dismissed agents pleaded his cause to a
typically unsympathetic Baker:
Mr. Baker, you may not realize the position in
which I an placed in, out on the prairie with my
family and household effects, without nothing [sicl
to live of Csi£]- my position taken from me without
any warning and my last month's wages kept back.''
Such actions were the exception rather than the rule.
However, Bcker did engage in business for his own
financial gain with little thought for those from whom
he gaxned his money.
Baker did make a number of contributions to early
North Dakota history.

He maintained close ties with many

political leaders in North Dakota and undoubtedly
3

Letter, Carlson to Baker, Jan. 1C, 1910, I. P.
Baker Papers, Box 43, Folder 1.
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influenced their decisions on many business matters of
the day.

His fascination with scientific agriculture led

to his receiving a gold medal for his grass seed, alfalfa
and hay at the St. Louis World's Fair in 1904.^

His

packet line on the Missouri River helped bring settlers
into the remoter area of North Dakota along the Missouri
River.

His elevators along the Missouri River similarly

enabled farmers to settle the area and have a place
nearby to sell their grain and purchase their hardware
and lumber needs.

Baker's wide advertising brought in

many settlers to North Dakota during the first one and
one-half decades of the twentieth century.

Without his

dispersal of the land through his Bismarck Realty Company,
much of it might have been bought by a few large land
concerns and never dispersed among the many incoming
families to North Dakota.

Looked at in another light,

however, the large number of settlers coming into the
state may have contributed to what E. B. Robinson refers
to as North Dakota's "Too-Much Mistake."^

More settlers

came than the state's semiarid environment could provide
for, and many failing to earn a living were forced to
leave.

Similarly, although the three companies examined

in this study eventually folded, they played a valuable
4

'"Isaac Post Baker, Who Was Who In America, 1943,
I (1397-1942), 47.
“EIvyn 3. Robinson, History of North Dakota,
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966), p. 372.
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role in the development of pioneer North Dakota.
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